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  Abstract 
 
Individuals do not only show large differences with regard to the judgments and 
decisions they make, but also with regard to the strategies they use to arrive at their 
decisions. However, individual differences in decision strategy selection have gained 
insufficient attention so far. For this reason, I investigate individual differences with 
respect to the application of the fast-and-frugal heuristics of the adaptive toolbox – a 
framework that has become increasingly important within the field of decision making. 
In particular, I address one of the most prominent examples of the adaptive toolbox: the 
recognition heuristic (RH), that is, a decision strategy for paired comparisons which 
bases choice solely on recognition while ignoring any additional information.  
The overarching aim of my thesis is to enhance the understanding of the 
cognitive and personality traits underlying individual differences in use of the RH. 
However, so far, there has been a deficiency in the methods relating individual traits to 
RH-use. For this purpose, I extend a measurement model of the RH to a hierarchical 
version incorporating individual traits directly into the estimation of RH-use. This 
methodological advance allows detection of the dispositional determinants of variation 
in strategy selection regarding the RH in a straightforward and unbiased way.  
Equipped with the required methods, the first project reported in this thesis 
investigates temporal and cross-situational stability in use of the RH. By demonstrating 
these important preconditions, I ensure that it is principally possible to find reliable 
relations between individual traits and RH-use. Building upon these results, the second 
project addresses the effect of (fluid and crystallized) intelligence on individual 
differences in adaptive RH-use. In sum, there is supportive evidence that adaptive 
application of the RH to the decision context is moderated by fluid but not crystallized 
intelligence. Extending this line of research, the third project aims at explaining 
individual differences in RH-use free of any interaction with the situation. In brief, RH-
use is found to decrease with need for cognition (i.e., inclination towards cognitively 
demanding activities) but not to increase with faith in intuition (i.e., trust in feelings). 
To conclude, by means of the three projects reported herein and with the aid of 
the newly developed hierarchical measurement model of RH-use, I demonstrate that 
RH-use represents a person-specific decision making style that is temporally and cross-
situationally stable, and that is affected by fluid intelligence and need for cognition.  
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1. Manuscripts 
 
This thesis is based on the three manuscripts listed below. In the following 
sections, I give a short introduction to the theory and especially to the newly developed 
methods, briefly summarize each of the manuscripts, and provide a general discussion 
as well as an outlook for future directions. The three manuscripts are attached at the end 
of this thesis in the same order as presented here. 
 
 
Manuscript 1 
Michalkiewicz, M., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Individual differences in use of the 
recognition heuristic are stable across time, choice objects, domains, and 
presentation formats. Memory & Cognition, 44, 454-468. doi:10.3758/s13421-
015-0567-6 
 
Manuscript 2 
Michalkiewicz, M., Arden, K., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Do smarter people make better 
decisions? The influence of intelligence on adaptive use of the recognition 
heuristic. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
 
Manuscript 3 
Michalkiewicz, M., Minich, B., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Explaining individual 
differences in fast-and-frugal decision making: The impact of need for cognition 
and faith in intuition on use of the recognition heuristic. Manuscript submitted 
for publication. 
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2. Introduction 
 
“When optimal solutions are out of reach, we are not paralyzed to inaction or doomed 
to failure. We can use heuristics to discover good solutions.” (Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 63) 
 
We all have to make many decisions and judgments every day. Which orange 
juice should I buy? Which stocks should I invest in? Which football team should I bet 
on in the next game? If we do not know the answer, we have to infer it from our 
knowledge or based on information that we can acquire from the decision environment. 
In fact, the answers to many questions are often not directly accessible, thus rendering 
our decisions uncertain. Furthermore, due to a lack of time, limited knowledge and 
limited cognitive resources, we are forced to make decisions and judgments without 
constantly retrieving all available knowledge, searching for all existing information in 
the environment, and consciously evaluating every alternative. But how do we make a 
decision or a judgment under these circumstances?  
Addressing this important question, Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research 
Group (1999) introduced the metaphor of the adaptive toolbox. According to this 
framework, decision makers are equipped with a repertoire of strategies – termed 
heuristics – to solve the decision problems they face. Heuristics are characterized as 
domain-specific, meaning that each heuristic is tailored to a specific decision task and 
situation. Also, heuristics are considered fast-and-frugal, as they require only a 
minimum of information, time, and cognitive resources (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). 
As such, information search focuses on only a small part of the available information 
and is terminated by a simple stopping rule. Additionally, choice follows a simple and 
clearly defined decision rule based on a small amount of information found.  
Within the last decades, the adaptive toolbox framework has inspired much 
innovative research within the field of decision making, and has proposed a large 
number of heuristics (for an overview, see for instance Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2009; Hertwig & Pachur, 
2015). In my thesis, I address the recognition heuristic (RH; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
1999, 2002), which is introduced in the next section. I decided to pay attention to this 
heuristic for two main reasons. First, the RH has already been intensively studied, 
which assures a fairly comprehensive theory as a starting point for my research. 
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Second, the RH represents an essential building block of multi-alternative decision 
strategies (e.g., Frosch, Beaman, & McCloy, 2007; Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, 
Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 2010; McCloy, Beaman, & Smith, 2008), of other 
fast-and-frugal heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999), and of strategies with 
respect to preferences (Hoyer & Brown, 1990; Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 
1989; Macdonald & Sharp, 2000; Oeusoonthornwattana & Shanks, 2010). Thus, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the results of my thesis do not only offer insights into 
properties of the RH but also broaden our understanding of many other decision 
strategies.  
Note that I do not reiterate all findings on the RH in what follows (for a review, 
see for instance Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; Pachur, Todd, Gigerenzer, Schooler, & 
Goldstein, 2011; Pohl, 2011). Instead, I focus on specific aspects that are important for 
the development of the research questions posed in my thesis. 
 
 
2.1. The Recognition Heuristic (RH) 
 
“If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized 
object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002, p. 76) 
 
The RH is one of the simplest and yet most widely investigated strategies of the 
adaptive toolbox. When deciding between recognized and unrecognized choice objects, 
the RH exploits a core human ability, namely, recognition memory: Decisions are 
exclusively determined by whether or not the objects are recognized; any additional 
knowledge is ignored. For example, when asked to infer which of two cities is more 
populous, “Tokyo” or “Harbin”, according to the RH, a decision maker should choose 
Tokyo simply because he or she recognizes Tokyo but has not heard of Harbin. The 
alternative strategy is the integration of knowledge about the recognized object 
retrieved from memory. To illustrate, a decision maker might choose Tokyo based on 
her or his knowledge that Tokyo is the Japanese capital and that national capitals are 
most often more populous than ordinary cities. Both strategies result in the same 
decision but differ in the underlying cognitive mechanisms. 
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In general, the RH represents a useful decision strategy as it exploits the 
systematic link between recognition and the decision criterion inherent in a large 
number of decision situations. The strength of this link, called recognition validity, 
determines the accuracy or success of the RH. To be precise, the recognition validity 
has been defined by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) as the proportion of cases where 
the recognized object has a higher value than the unrecognized object with respect to 
the decision criterion (based on all cases where one object is recognized and the other is 
not). To illustrate, when asked to infer which of two cities is more populous, people 
should be more likely to recognize more populous cities because they appear more 
often in the media and in everyday conversations.  
For this reason, the RH has been shown to be successful in many decision tasks, 
often leading to the same amount or even more accurate inferences than the use of more 
advanced knowledge-based strategies. One important requirement for the RH to be 
useful, and in fact used, is that the recognition validity is larger than the knowledge 
validity. Knowledge validity is defined as the proportion of cases where use of 
knowledge leads to a correct response, or as stated by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), 
as the probability of a correct response when both objects are recognized. Tasks with 
this feature include geographical questions like the size of cities or the length of rivers 
(e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Pohl, 2006), as well as economic and political 
questions like the safety of airlines and the success of politicians (e.g., Gaissmaier & 
Marewski, 2011; Richter & Späth, 2006). Furthermore, the RH has been found to 
outperform experts when forecasting sport events (e.g., Ayton, Önkal, & McReynolds, 
2011; Pachur & Biele, 2007; Scheibehenne & Bröder, 2007; Serwe & Frings, 2006) and 
to outperform sophisticated marked indices when predicting stock-market performance 
(e.g., Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, & Gigerenzer, 1999; Erdfelder, Küpper-Tetzel, & 
Mattern, 2011; Newell & Shanks, 2004).1  
So far, the vast majority of research has focused on specific properties of the 
decision situation which might affect RH-use. In fact, it is quite well established that 
decision makers apply the RH in accordance with the decision context. A summary of 
the corresponding findings is given in the following section.  
                                                 
1
 Of course, there is also research showing that the success of the RH can easily disappear under 
certain conditions (e.g., McCloy, Beaman, Frosch, & Goddard, 2010; Oppenheimer, 2003; Pachur & 
Hertwig, 2006; Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008; Pohl, 2011; Richter & Späth, 2006). 
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2.2. Adaptive RH-Use 
 
“The question is not whether individuals always rely on a given heuristic, but whether 
they use heuristics in an adaptive way.” (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009, p. 134) 
 
There is general agreement that decision makers display a great deal of 
adaptivity. Accordingly, individuals chose among different decision strategies as a 
function of their own cognitive capacities on the one hand and the requirements of the 
situation on the other hand (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1988, 1993; Simon, 1956, 1990). Building upon these insights, Gigerenzer et 
al. (1999) acknowledge that individuals have to select decision strategies in accordance 
with their own resources, meaning available knowledge and available cognitive 
capacities. At the same time, they recognize the influence of the environmental 
structure, for instance, in terms of success rates of different decision strategies or time 
required to execute them. Emphasizing the adaptive aspect of decision making even 
more, Gigerenzer et al. (1999) apply the concept of ecologic rationality, that is, the 
match between the structure of a heuristic and the structure of the respective 
environment. In this sense, the success of a heuristic can only be judged within the 
corresponding decision context. 
Previous work has consistently demonstrated adaptive use of the RH. However, 
this research mostly focused on situational influences. In particular, decision makers 
were shown to use the RH adaptively depending on the size of the recognition and the 
knowledge validities. More precisely, they applied the RH more often the more valid 
the recognition cue was (e.g., Castela, Kellen, Erdfelder, & Hilbig, 2014; Hilbig, 
Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010; Pachur, Mata, & Schooler, 2009; Pohl, 2006; Scheibehenne & 
Bröder, 2007). In contrast, decision makers applied the RH less, the easier further 
knowledge was available and could be integrated (e.g., Bröder & Eichler, 2006; 
Glöckner & Bröder, 2011, 2014; Hilbig, Michalkiewicz, Castela, Pohl, & Erdfelder, 
2015; Hilbig, Pohl, & Bröder, 2009; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Richter & Späth, 
2006). Additionally, decision makers were shown to adapt RH-use dependent on the 
current constraints of the situation. In particular, they applied the RH more often when 
they had to make inferences under time pressure (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2012; 
Pachur & Hertwig, 2006).  
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Although there is clear evidence that people use decision strategies adaptively, 
there is also agreement that there are limitations to human adaptivity and that failures in 
adaptivity do occur (Payne et al., 1993). However, only few studies investigated 
adaptive RH-use with respect to cognitive limitations, for instance, RH-use under 
depleted cognitive resources (Pohl, Erdfelder, Hilbig, Liebke, & Stahlberg, 2013). This 
gap suggests that one essential aspect has been largely neglected in most studies: 
individual differences in the application of the RH as well as their dispositional 
determinants. I will take a closer look at these aspects in the next section. 
 
 
2.3. Individual Differences in RH-Use 
 
“Strategy differences between people appear to be the rule rather than marginal 
exceptions.” (Pachur et al., 2008, p. 205) 
 
Many studies originally tailored to investigate the use of the RH on the group 
level also revealed large individual differences in RH-use within groups over and above 
situational influences. Figure 1 illustrates this insight by showing individual-level 
analyses of studies on RH-use comprising no situational manipulation. In this case, 
individual RH-use is assessed via the latent-trait r-model described in detail in section 
3.2.2. As can be seen in Figure 1, even under constant contextual conditions, 
participants differ to a large extent with regard to individual RH-use within each 
experiment. Similar findings have repeatedly been found throughout the literature (e.g., 
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Hilbig & Richter, 2011; Marewski et al., 2010; Newell & 
Shanks, 2004; Pachur et al., 2008). However, until now, there is very limited work on 
dispositional determinants that might explain this large variation in RH-use.  
So far, only Hilbig (2008) successfully investigated determinants of differences 
in RH-use on the individual level. In particular, he demonstrated that neuroticism is 
associated with higher levels of adherence to the RH. Apart from this finding, there is 
evidence that different groups of people might show preferences for different strategies. 
For instance, Hilbig and Pohl (2008) found that more knowledgeable people tended to 
refrain from applying the RH compared to less knowledgeable ones. Exploring a 
different source of individual differences, Pachur et al. (2009) and Pohl, von Massow, 
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and Beckmann (2016) investigated RH-use across the lifespan. In particular, Pohl et al. 
(2016) found that adolescents applied the RH more frequently compared to both 
preadolescent children and young adults, whereas preadolescent children and young 
adults showed similar levels of RH-use. Additionally, Pachur et al. (2009) showed that 
elderly people relied on the RH more often compared to young adults (for a reanalysis, 
see Horn, Pachur, & Mata, 2015). In fact, although the findings concerning age are 
limited to groups, they support the idea that RH-use might be determined by person-
specific characteristics.  
To conclude, the examples described above show that individuals significantly 
differ from each other with regard to the propensity to rely on the RH even under 
constant contextual conditions. At the same time, the existing research reveals that 
there is a lack of research on potential explanations waiting to be filled. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Individual proportions of RH-use per participant for the data from Hilbig (2008), 
Hilbig and Pohl (2009, Exp.1), Hilbig, Pohl, and Bröder (2009), and Hilbig, Erdfelder, and Pohl 
(2011). RH-use is estimated by means of the latent-trait r-model (Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 
2016) and ordered by size.2 
                                                 
2
 I am grateful to Benjamin Hilbig for providing the raw data of Hilbig (2008), Hilbig and Pohl 
(2009), Hilbig et al. (2009), and Hilbig et al. (2011). 
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2.4. Explaining Individual Differences in RH-Use 
 
“Whereas there is substantial evidence that task characteristics influence decisions and 
initial evidence that individual differences affect various stages of decision making, 
what is not clear is the nature of relations among situational variables, individual 
differences, and decision-making processes.” (Mohammed & Schwall, 2009, p. 294) 
  
Investigating the effects of individual traits (as well as the interaction of 
situational variables and individual traits) on decision behavior represents an important 
goal not only from the perspective of decision making but also from the perspective of 
personality psychology. To illustrate, there is agreement in the field of decision making 
that choice of the appropriate decision strategy for a particular problem is largely 
determined by both the characteristics of the decision problem and the characteristics of 
the decision maker (e.g., Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011; Mohammed & 
Schwall, 2009; Payne et al., 1993; Stanovich & West, 2000).3 Although, for instance, 
the adaptive decision maker framework (Payne et al., 1993) largely focuses on adaptive 
behavior with respect to task and context variables, it also makes clear that there are 
individual differences in decision strategy selection which are moderated by person-
specific variables like cognitive ability and prior knowledge. In a similar way, research 
in personality psychology emphasizes the importance of exploring how personality, 
situations, and behaviors are interrelated (e.g., Fleeson & Noftle, 2008; Funder, 2001, 
2008; Mischel, 1968). In particular, the question is asked whether individual 
differences in specific personality traits are large enough to have a substantial influence 
on behavior, and whether this influence persists under varying situational conditions. 
Hence, the same conclusion is reached from both perspectives: To fully understand 
human decision behavior it is crucial to understand 1) the situational and 2) the 
individual determinants of decision strategy selection. However, despite the 
                                                 
3
 According to Payne et al. (1993), the social context represents the third major factor of 
determinants of strategy selection, including concepts like group membership. This factor will not be 
discussed further as it is of minor interest for the research questions posed in this thesis. For more 
information on group decision making with respect to heuristic-use, see for instance Reimer and 
Hoffrage (2003, 2005, 2006), and especially with respect to the RH, see Kämmer, Gaissmaier, Reimer, 
and Schermuly (2014) and Reimer and Katsikopoulos (2004). 
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fundamental importance of this research question, little information on the influence of 
personality (and of the situation-personality interaction) on behavior is available (e.g., 
Funder, 2001; Mohammed & Schwall, 2009). This lack of information is particularly 
visible with respect to the RH as summarized in sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
Unquestionably, no trait variable in isolation might sufficiently account for the 
large individual variation in decision strategy selection. Rather, individual differences 
in decision behavior are evoked by a combination of different traits (e.g., Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Unquestionably, there are many personality theories that could account 
for individual differences in decision strategy selection. For instance, Bröder (2012) 
reported a large series of studies on the influence of personality on use of the 
take-the-best heuristic (TTB4; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). In the same way, it 
might be considered to successively investigate these individual traits and even more 
with respect to the RH. This would result in a comprehensive overview regarding the 
quest which trait variables determine RH-use and which do not. However, without a 
strong theory this approach would be based on the try and error principle. Instead, we 
need to wisely select a promising starting point, that is, a stable trait variable that offers 
a strong theoretical framework relevant for our decision task and that enables deriving 
clear and testable predictions (e.g., Mohammed & Schwall, 2009; Phillips, Fletcher, 
Marks, & Hine, 2016). Specifically, the following two approaches seem most 
promising.  
First, consider the variation in cognitive capacity as an explanation for 
individual differences in adaptive decision making. In fact, cognitive capacity is often 
assumed to represent the most fundamental predictor of reasoning (e.g., Stanovich & 
West, 1998, 2000). The best way to operationalize cognitive capacity is in terms of its 
most fundamental form, namely, intelligence. Indeed, measures of general intelligence 
have been shown to be linked to practically all sub-processes belonging to human 
cognition (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Kane, Conway, & Hambrick, 2005). Therefore, I explore 
the effect of intelligence on adaptive RH-use, in line with the idea that adaptivity is 
generally interpreted as a sign of intelligence (e.g., Larrick, Nisbett, & Morgan, 1993; 
                                                 
4
 The TTB heuristic sequentially compares the cues of two or more alternatives, ordered by cue 
validity (from the highest to the lowest), and chooses the alternative that is superior with regard to the 
first cue that discriminates between alternatives. 
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Neisser et al., 1996; Payne et al., 1993; Sternberg & Salter, 1982). The results of this 
investigation are summarized in section 4.2. 
Second, consider information processing styles (or dual process models of 
information processing) as an explanation for individual differences in decision strategy 
selection. According to Stanovich and West (1998, 2000), information processing styles 
can be regarded as the second most fundamental predictor of individual differences in 
decision making. According to Evans and Over (2010), for instance, a theory of 
heuristic decision making even requires an underlying dual process framework of 
information processing to be complete. Dual process models of information processing 
have been widely applied (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Chaiken, 
1980; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), thus showing the importance of this account. Although 
they have been formalized in slightly different ways, they all agree on the same basic 
idea of two fundamental information processing systems, one analytic-rational and one 
intuitive-experiential.5 I focus on the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (Epstein et al., 
1996) as it offers a fruitful theoretical ground for deriving predictions regarding 
decision making with the RH. Furthermore and in contrast to virtually all other 
approaches, this theory also offers measurement tools for assessing individual 
differences with respect to the two proposed information processing styles. The 
corresponding findings are reported in section 4.3. 
To assess potential determinants of RH-use, the application of powerful 
measures of RH-use is of special importance as it will boost the correlation with 
measures of personality (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000). Thus, before I turn to the 
question of which person-specific factors might explain individual differences in 
heuristic use, it is important to briefly introduce some methodological aspects. These 
methodological preliminaries include the typical task environment as well as the newly 
developed measurement model of RH-use, which represents a main contribution to this 
thesis.  
                                                 
5
 Depending on the theory, the two systems of information processing are called differently, for 
instance, central and peripheral (Cacioppo et al., 1986), systematic and heuristic (Chaiken, 1980), rule-
based and associative (Sloman, 1996), or extensional and intuitive (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
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3. Methodological Background 
 
“Clearly, the RH is a precise model which makes exact predictions about choices and 
underlying processes. However, to gain insight about whether and under which 
conditions these predictions are actually correct, measurement must also be precise.” 
(Hilbig, 2010, p. 272) 
 
When investigating the RH, several conditions must be fulfilled (cf. Gigerenzer 
& Goldstein, 2011). First, the RH has been defined for natural recognition as opposed 
to experimentally induced recognition. However, this requirement has not always been 
fulfilled (e.g., Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Oppenheimer, 2003). 
Second, inferences should be made from memory as opposed to inferences from givens, 
where information is openly presented to the decision maker. Also this proposition has 
not always been followed (e.g., Ayton et al., 2011; Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Goldstein 
& Gigerenzer, 2002; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Richter & Späth, 2006). Third, the 
recognition validity should be substantial, rendering the RH a successful and thus 
useful strategy, as opposed to a value close to chance level (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 
2004; Pohl, 2006; Richter & Späth, 2006). All empirical investigations reported in this 
thesis satisfied the concepts of natural recognition, memory-based knowledge, and RH-
friendly decision domains as explained above.6 There was only one exception from 
these preliminaries: A decision domain disfavoring RH-use was used in the second 
manuscript for specific reasons, as will be explained in section 4.2. 
To investigate the RH, a paradigm has been established that consists of a 
recognition task and a paired comparison task (e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; 
Pohl, 2006). To this end, a representative set of objects is randomly drawn from a 
reference class, that is, an exclusively defined set of objects (e.g., the world’s 100 most 
populous cities with a population of more than 3 million inhabitants). In the recognition 
task, decision makers have to provide yes-no recognition judgments for each object. 
For the paired comparison task, the set of objects is (most often exhaustively) paired. In 
                                                 
6
 For sake of completeness, I would like to mention that further critical experimental set-ups 
have been discussed by Pachur et al. (2008), in particular, use of induced cue knowledge, use of criterion 
knowledge, presentation of cue knowledge about unrecognized objects, and use of artificial stimuli. 
However, none of these critical experimental set-ups is comprised in the studies reported here. 
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the comparison task, decision makers are asked to decide which of the two objects in 
each pair has the higher value with respect to the criterion of interest (e.g., which city is 
more populous). Again, all empirical investigations reported in this thesis adhere to this 
paradigm. 
 
 
3.1. Assessing RH-Use 
 
 “How can one tell whether people are following the recognition heuristic or choosing 
correctly by some other means?” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 83) 
 
Besides the methodological preliminaries and experimental set-ups described 
above, it is important to measure RH-use in an unbiased way, that is, without confounds 
with other strategies. Therefore, choice of the appropriate measure is discussed next.  
 
3.1.1. Ad-Hoc Measures of RH-Use 
In the last two decades, several measures of RH-use have been suggested 
(Hilbig & Pohl, 2008; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). However, all of them display severe 
limitations, which are briefly sketched in the following. For an extensive review and 
comparison of all measures of RH-use described here, see Hilbig (2010) or Pachur 
(2011). 
To begin with, the adherence rate is defined as the proportion of pairs where the 
recognized object is chosen. The central disadvantage of the adherence rate is that RH-
use is confounded with knowledge integration. In other words, the recognized object 
can be chosen for different reasons, one being recognition alone, another being further 
knowledge retrieved from memory (e.g., Hilbig, 2010). Unfortunately, it is often not 
possible to disentangle different strategies based solely on choice patterns because these 
strategies may predict the same choices under certain circumstances. In particular, the 
adherence rate is not able to disentangle use of the RH and integration of knowledge 
when the available knowledge is in line with the recognition cue. Consequently, the 
adherence rate will typically overestimate the probability of RH-use (e.g., Hilbig & 
Richter, 2011).  
14 
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Next, two measures derived from signal detection theory (SDT; for an 
introduction, see Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) have been proposed based on the SDT 
hit and false alarm rates (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). When deciding between a 
recognized and an unrecognized object, choosing the recognized object denotes a hit, in 
case it represents the correct answer, and a false alarm, in case it represents the false 
answer. The index c displays the tendency to follow the recognition cue. It is 
formalized as ܿ = − ଵଶ  ሺ�ሺ�ሻ + �ሺ��ሻሻ with �ሺ�ሻ and �ሺ��ሻ denoting the 
z-transformed hit and false alarm rates, respectively. The index d’, formalized as ݀’ = �ሺ�ሻ − �ሺ��ሻ, displays the ability to discriminate cases where recognition leads 
to a correct versus a false inference. Certainly, the two indices provide less confounded 
measurements of RH-use than the adherence rate. But there are limitations to their 
interpretation as well. First, none of them can be understood as the proportion of RH-
use. Second, it is not clear how to interpret the exact values of c and d’. In principle, 
true users of the RH should score c < 0 and d’ = 0. However, under the realistic 
assumption of strategy execution errors, there are no conventions where to set the 
threshold for c, nor how wide to define the interval around zero for d’ to classify 
decision makers as users versus non-users of the RH. Thus, c and d’ can only be used as 
proxies for the probability of RH-use. 
Finally, the discrimination index DI = ሺ�ሻ − ሺ��ሻ was introduced (Hilbig & 
Pohl, 2008), with ሺ�ሻ denoting the hit rate and ሺ��ሻ the false alarm rate. In the same 
way as the index d’, the DI is defined as the ability to discriminate cases where the 
recognition cue leads to a correct versus a false inference. There are two main 
differences between these two measures: First, the DI is not theoretically dependent on 
SDT. Second, it is defined based on hit and false alarm rates instead of their z-
transformation. However, as the DI shares its interpretation with d’, it also shares its 
advantages and disadvantages.  
To overcome the limitations of the existing measures of RH-use, Hilbig, 
Erdfelder, and Pohl (2010) proposed the r-model, which is introduced in the next 
section. This model is of special interest for my thesis as it represents the basis of the 
newly developed measurement tool of RH-use. 
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3.1.2. The r-Model 
The r-model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010) belongs to the class of 
multinomial processing tree (MPT) models, that is, a class of statistical models that aim 
at explaining observed categorical data by latent cognitive processes (for an overview 
on MPT models, see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009). As illustrated 
in Figure 2, the r-model is designed to account for the three cases that can occur in a 
paired comparison task: knowledge cases (both objects recognized), guessing cases 
(neither object recognized), and recognition cases (exactly one object recognized). In 
particular, responses to the paired comparison task are assigned to eight mutually 
exclusive categories. The category counts are assumed to follow a multinomial 
distribution and are accounted for by four latent parameters according to the model: 
recognition validity (parameter a), knowledge validity (parameter b), probability of 
correct guessing (parameter g), and probability of RH-use (parameter r). These model 
parameters can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques (Hu & Batchelder, 
1994), which allow for goodness-of-fit testing. 
Consider the most relevant case: If one of the two objects is recognized, the RH 
is used with probability r, in which case the correct choice is made with the probability 
a, that recognition represents a valid cue. In contrast, additional knowledge is used with 
probability 1-r. In this case, the correctness of the decision depends on the probability 
a, that recognition represents a valid cue, and additionally on the probability b, that the 
available knowledge is valid.  
The r-model has been validated empirically and via simulations (Hilbig, 2010; 
Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010). Here, I would like to draw attention to its two most 
important advantages. First, the model assesses RH-use free of confounds with 
knowledge integration (in contrast to the adherence rate). Second, the r parameter can 
be directly interpreted as the probability of RH-use and not only as a proxy (as opposed 
to the indices c, d’, and DI). Thus, the r-model is superior to the measures of RH-use 
described before, but it displays limitations as well. These limitations are explained in 
more detail in the following section. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of the r-model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010). The graph structure 
displays dependencies among observable events (rectangles) and the underlying latent states 
(rectangles with rounded corners). In particular, category counts for the eight mutually 
exclusive categories Cij (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) for the three object cases (i.e., both, 
neither, and one object recognized) are accounted for by the four model parameters a, b, g, and 
r, which represent recognition validity, knowledge validity, the probability of correct guessing, 
and the probability of RH-use, respectively. 
 
 
3.2. Assessing Individual Differences in RH-Use 
 
“Individual-level tests are essential because in virtually every task we find individual 
differences in strategies.” (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009, p. 133) 
 
Most studies on RH-use investigated strategy selection on the group level. 
However, group-level analyses are based on two problematic assumptions: 
independence of the underlying cognitive processes and homogeneity across 
individuals (e.g., Klauer, 2010; Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder, & Wagenmakers, 2015). 
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Stated differently, it is assumed that all aspects of task performance, that is, recognition 
validity, knowledge validity, guessing accuracy, and RH-use (as measured by the r-
model parameters) are uncorrelated. It is further assumed that individuals do not differ 
regarding the processes estimated through the model parameters. The major problem is 
that violations of these two assumptions can lead to highly erroneous conclusions. 
Unquestionably, relations between many cognitive processes do exist (e.g., 
LaBar, Gitelman, Parrish, & Mesulam, 1999; McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & 
Hambrick, 2010; Miyake et al., 2000). By implication, correlations between model 
parameters, representing the underlying cognitive processes, are very likely (Klauer, 
2010; see also Matzke et al., 2015). Specifically, RH-use has been shown to increase 
with recognition validity, and to decrease with knowledge validity on the group level 
(see section 2.2). Consequently, these and other aspects of task performance might also 
be correlated on the individual level (e.g., Hilbig & Pohl, 2008; Pohl, 2006).  
Similarly, individual variables can influence the performance in many cognitive 
tasks (e.g., Booth, Schinka, Brown, Mortimer, & Borenstein, 2006; Revelle, 1987; 
Rindermann & Neubauer, 2001). Accordingly, individual differences in personality 
traits, cognitive skills, or demographic factors may lead to violations of the 
homogeneity assumption of MPT models (e.g., Arnold, Bayen, & Böhm, 2014; Arnold, 
Bayen, & Smith, 2015; Coolin, Erdfelder, Bernstein, Thornton, & Thornton, 2015; 
Horn et al., 2015). As illustrated in section 2.3, this finding also holds for the RH and 
the r-model. In addition, a simple example demonstrates how grave this problem is: 
Individual recognition and knowledge validities might vary simply because individuals 
recognize different objects.  
If the homogeneity assumption is violated, group-level analyses can result in 
biased parameter estimates, underestimated standard errors, and underestimated 
confidence intervals (e.g., Klauer, 2006; Riefer & Batchelder, 1991; Smith & 
Batchelder, 2008; Stahl & Klauer, 2007). As a consequence, goodness-of-fit tests and 
hypothesis tests will result in erroneous rejections of adequate models and overrated 
numbers of significant differences (e.g., Klauer, 2006; Smith & Batchelder, 2008). If 
the independence assumption is additionally violated, the extent of these statistical 
problems may vary widely depending on the covariance structure of the r-model 
parameters (Klauer, 2006, 2010). On the whole, given parameter heterogeneity and 
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correlations between parameters, group-level analyses can result in all kinds of 
deficient conclusions. 
An alternative approach to assess RH-use, which accounts for heterogeneity 
across decision makers, is individual-level analysis, that is, applying the r-model to the 
data of each participant separately (e.g., Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010, 2011; Hilbig 
& Richter, 2011). However, this procedure can also be problematic for several reasons. 
First, small numbers of observations per participant can lead to biased parameter 
estimates, large confidence intervals, and low power to detect model misfit (e.g., 
Chechile, 2009; Cohen, Sanborn, & Shiffrin, 2008; Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010). 
To demonstrate, Hilbig, Erdfelder, and Pohl (2010) have shown that a minimum of 500 
paired comparisons per individual is needed to reliably estimate the parameters of the 
r-model. However, studies on RH-use typically involve only about 90 to 190 
comparisons per individual. As a consequence, individual-level analysis may lead to 
flawed results in most cases.  
Second, the correlation between the hypothesized latent processes cannot be 
measured properly by the observed correlation of the estimated model parameters. To 
illustrate, the Pearson correlation often underestimates the true correlation between two 
latent variables when the observations are subject to measurement noise (e.g., 
Spearman, 1904). But measurement error represents the rule rather than an exception. 
In particular, the standard errors of the r parameter estimates, a proxy for measurement 
noise, typically range up to .25 on the individual level. Thus, correcting for the 
measurement error of the r-model’s parameter estimates is of special importance when 
assessing correlations among parameters (Matzke et al., 2015). This will be the case in 
section 4.1.  
Finally, the influence of external covariates on RH-use can only be assessed in a 
two-step procedure. In a first step, the r-model is applied to the data of individual 
persons. In a second step, the resulting estimates of RH-use are regressed on or 
correlated with personality test scores. As explained before, the regression or 
correlation analysis does not account for the measurement error of the r-model’s 
parameter estimates and can therefore lead to biased estimates of the regression and 
correlation coefficients (e.g. Behseta, Berdyyeva, Olson, & Kass, 2009; Klauer, 2006; 
Matzke et al., 2015; Spearman, 1904). This problem especially accounts for the work 
presented in sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
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To overcome these problems, in recent years a growing number of researchers 
have proposed approaches to MPT models that accommodate heterogeneity between 
individuals. However, since this line of research is quite new, choice of the appropriate 
method has to be carefully considered. In the next section, I give a brief introduction to 
the most important approaches proposed so far and evaluate if they are appropriate to 
answer the research questions posed in this thesis.7 
 
3.2.1. Hierarchical Approaches 
In response to the issues described above, researchers have developed several 
hierarchical extensions to traditional MPT models. The basic idea of a hierarchical 
approach is that the model is specified on two levels. On the individual level, a separate 
and possibly different set of parameters is defined for each individual according to the 
basic MPT model (e.g., the r-model described in section 3.1.2). On the hierarchical 
group level, these individual parameters are assumed to follow some distribution, the so 
called hyper-distribution, which captures the variability between individuals using 
group-level parameters. Furthermore, to answer the research questions posed in this 
thesis, the hierarchical model should also account for the relations between parameters 
within the model as well as the relations to external trait variables.  
To begin with, Klauer (2006) suggested hierarchical latent-class MPT models 
using a discrete hyper-distribution of group-level parameters. According to this 
approach, each participant can be assigned to one of the mutually exclusive latent 
classes of model parameters. Within each class, parameter homogeneity is assumed, 
whereas between classes there can be differences between parameters as well as 
correlations across parameters. Despite its ability to test and account for parameter 
heterogeneity, the latent-class approach features two major limitations. First, it can only 
                                                 
7
 In the following, I only consider heterogeneity between individuals as this represents the core 
interest of my thesis. Certainly, heterogeneity in stimulus materials might also exist. However, this 
problem might be less severe as stimulus materials are usually carefully selected and more thoroughly 
controlled than is possible with regard to participants. Indeed, there are no indications for an influence of 
particular stimulus objects on RH-use, neither in the studies this thesis is based on nor in the literature. 
Also, note that the methods described in the following sections can all be applied to situations where 
items (instead of individuals) differ. Additionally, a method to simultaneously handle heterogeneity in 
individuals and items has recently been developed by Matzke et al. (2015). Thus, it is principally also 
possible to investigate effects of stimulus materials on RH-use. 
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assess heterogeneity between an a-priori defined number of latent groups but not 
between individuals within these groups. To illustrate, although each class could 
theoretically consist of a single person, on a practical level the number of classes will 
be limited due to model identifiability concerns and to difficulties interpreting a large 
number of classes (Klauer, 2006). Second, the relation to external covariates, such as 
cognitive or personality traits, is not modeled. Therefore, the latent-class approach 
represents a better approximation than traditional MPT models only in specific 
situations (e.g., Stahl & Degner, 2007; Stahl & Klauer, 2008, 2009). For instance, it 
might be a useful tool when a sample of people can be split a-priori into homogeneous 
subclasses according to some key variable like education level or age groups. However, 
this is of little help if we are interested in the continuous effect of individual traits on 
RH-use. In this case, the application of continuous instead of discrete hyper-
distributions seems more plausible.8  
In contrast to Klauer’s (2006) latent-class approach, Smith and Batchelder 
(2008) suggested the beta-MPT approach that captures the between-subject variability 
by means of continuous distributions, namely, beta distributions. However, as 
individual person parameters are assumed to follow independent beta distributions, the 
model does not account for correlations between parameters. Furthermore, until now, 
this approach does not incorporate the relations between external covariates and RH-
use. Overall, the beta-MPT approach can indeed be useful for certain research questions 
(e.g., Arnold et al., 2014; Horn et al., 2015), but is not tailored to answer the questions 
posed in this thesis. 
An approach incorporating all required features for my analyses is the 
hierarchical latent-trait approach to MPT models (Klauer, 2010). In particular, it 
accounts for heterogeneity within parameters and correlations across parameters. In 
                                                 
8
 An alternative non-hierarchical approach based on distinct classes or groups of individuals is 
recursive partitioning of MPT models (Strobl, Wickelmaier, & Zeileis, 2011; Wickelmaier & Zeileis, 
2013). The main advantage compared to Klauer’s (2006) latent-class approach is that the number of 
groups does not have to be determined a-priori but is defined based on the test scores of individual traits. 
However, just like the latent-class approach, it can only account for heterogeneity between groups, but 
not individuals within these groups. 
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addition, it allows for the assessment of the influence of cognitive and personality 
variables on RH-use in a straightforward way.9 
 
3.2.2. The Latent-Trait r-Model 
To investigate individual-level RH-use as well as its determinants, I am the first 
to propose a hierarchical extension of the r-model based on Klauer’s (2010) latent-trait 
approach to MPT models. Thereby, I close a methodological gap in research on 
individual differences in RH-use. Compared to conventional analyses and to the 
hierarchical approaches described before, the latent-trait approach has several 
advantages (Klauer, 2010; Matzke et al., 2016). First, model parameters are estimated 
more reliably than by means of non-hierarchical analyses by using information from the 
group-level structure (i.e., the hyper-distribution). Thus, parameter estimates are more 
reliable even in case of small numbers of paired comparisons per individual. Second, by 
applying a multivariate distribution the latent-trait r-model not only accounts for 
correlations between model parameters but even explicitly models them. Third, the 
relation to external variables can be included into the model in terms of a regression. In 
this way, the latent-trait r-model allows for the estimation of model parameters, 
correlations between model parameters, and the influence of external variables on 
model parameters in a one-step procedure. Thereby, the estimated correlations and 
regressions are automatically adjusted for the uncertainty of the individual parameter 
estimates of the r-model. In other words, the latent-trait r-model is constructed to 
estimate the true underlying correlation between model parameters and the true 
regression of the model parameters on external variables, respectively, free of 
measurement error.  
The latent-trait r-model, illustrated in Figure 3, is developed in two steps. In 
Michalkiewicz and Erdfelder (2016), we construct a hierarchical version of the r-model. 
Specifically, we extend it to account for two tests of the RH simultaneously. Thereby, 
we allow the assessment of the test-retest correlation, in other words, stability within 
                                                 
9
 Only recently, an alternative non-hierarchical approach to Klauer’s (2010) latent-trait model 
has been suggested, which differs mainly by using a logit instead of a probit link function and by using 
Maximum Likelihood techniques instead of Bayesian statistics (Coolin et al., 2015). However, this 
account does not model correlations between parameters. Furthermore, model parameters are estimated 
less reliably within this non-hierarchical approach compared to the hierarchical model. 
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model parameters across two tests of the RH. In Michalkiewicz, Arden, and Erdfelder 
(2016) as well as Michalkiewicz, Minich, and Erdfelder (2016), we incorporate external 
covariates into the model to explain variation in RH-use through individual traits. 
Specifically, the model’s parameters are estimated within the Bayesian framework. For 
this purpose, prior distributions are specified for all model parameters representing 
initial beliefs (as described in the caption of Figure 3). These prior distributions are then 
updated using the observed data. Thereby, posterior distributions are obtained whose 
statistical properties (in particular, the mean and the 95% Bayesian credible interval) 
are used to summarize the results. For a comprehensive introduction to hierarchical 
MPT models and more details on the Bayesian estimation process, see for instance Lee 
and Wagenmakers (2013). 
The latent-trait r-model in Figure 3 shows the individual-level and the 
hierarchical group-level structure. In particular, the individual-level structure is based 
on the r-model. The group-level structure assumes that individual differences between 
participants are defined by a common continuous distribution – a multivariate normal 
distribution with mean vector (μa, μb, μg, μr) and variance-covariance matrix Σ. The 
means μs (s ∈ {a, b, g, r}) are interpreted as the group level parameter estimates of 
recognition validity, knowledge validity, guessing validity, and probability of RH-use, 
respectively. Based on the variance-covariance matrix Σ, the standard deviations σs 
(s ∈ {a, b, g, r}) and the correlations ρୱ,୲ (s, t ∈ {a, b, g, r}) between model parameters 
are derived. In particular, σs (s ∈ {a, b, g, r}) represent the variability across 
individuals, being close to zero when individuals are rather homogeneous and closer to 
one the larger the heterogeneity between individuals. For each individual i, i = 1, …, I, 
model parameters si = Φ(μs + ξs ∙ δis), s ∈ {a, b, g, r}, are modeled as the probit-
transformed linear combination of the group mean μs, the individual displacement from 
the group mean δis, and a multiplicative scaling parameter ξs. To estimate the effect of 
an individual trait on RH-use, a regression term β ∙ Covi is included in the linear 
function, consisting of a regression weight β and individual test scores of a trait 
variable Covi. Examples, on how to extend the model to account for the effect of two 
(or more) individual traits, are given in Michalkiewicz, Arden, and Erdfelder (2016), 
and Michalkiewicz, Minich, and Erdfelder (2016).  
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Figure 3. Illustration of the latent-trait r-model including a dispositional predictor of RH-use 
(adapted from Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016). The graph structure displays dependencies 
among observed data (shaded nodes) and latent model parameters (unshaded nodes). The 
square and circular nodes represent discrete and continuous variables, respectivley. The single- 
bordered nodes represent variables that have to be estimated from the data, while the double-
bordered nodes represent variables that can be derived as a combination of other model 
parameters. The plates show the I individuals and the J object cases (i.e., both, neither, and one 
object recognized). Individual category probabilities P(Cij) are defined according to the r-model 
(Figure 2). Thereby, Cij ~ Multinomial(P(Cij), Nij) represents the multinomially distributed 
category counts and Nij the number of observations. Individual model parameters 
si (s ∈ {a, b, g, r}) are assessed as the probit-transformed linear combination of the group mean 
μs ~ Normal(0,1), a multiplicative scale parameter ξs ~ Uniform(0,100), and individual 
displacement parameters δis ~ MultivariateNormal(0,Σ). The individual displacement 
parameters as well as the group standard deviations σs are derived from the covariance structure 
of the model’s parameters Σ ~ Wishard(I,5). Additionally, the influence of an individual trait 
Covi on RH-use ri is modeled in terms of a regression with regression coefficient 
β ~ Normal(0,1).  
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4. Summaries of Manuscripts 
 
“There are large individual differences in strategy selection. The attempt to find 
personality dimensions as correlates of strategy preferences has not been successful so 
far […].” (Bröder & Newell, 2008, p. 208) 
 
In the following sections, I provide summaries of the three manuscripts this 
thesis is based on. Thereby, I focus on the main results, achievements, and limitations 
of each manuscript. For the sake of brevity, I refrain from reiterating details as all 
information can be found in the original manuscripts located at the end of this thesis. 
An extensive discussion and outlook with regard to the overarching objective of this 
thesis is provided in section 5.  
 
 
4.1. Stability in RH-Use 
 
Michalkiewicz, M., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Individual differences in use of the 
recognition heuristic are stable across time, choice objects, domains, and 
presentation formats. Memory & Cognition, 44, 454-468. doi:10.3758/s13421-
015-0567-6 
 
“It is yet an open question whether the different strategy preferences diagnosed in a 
one-shot assessment of an experiment will turn out to be stable across tasks and 
situations. If not then states rather than traits should be investigated as variables 
causing the individual differences […].” (Bröder & Newell, 2008, p. 208) 
 
Large individual differences in strategy selection have been consistently found 
in the literature, as I have summarized in section 2.3. However, before we can try to 
explain these differences in terms of cognitive or personality traits, an important 
condition needs to be checked in the first place: stability in the use of the RH. Only if 
RH-use represents a stable decision making style, it will be principally possible to find 
its personality determinants. For this purpose, we assessed stability in RH-use across 
time, choice objects, decision domains, and presentation formats. These situational 
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factors are assumed not to influence the overall level of RH-use as long as recognition 
and knowledge validities stay constant. By eliminating potential effects of situational 
factors we thus enabled the assessment of individual differences without confounds. 
Importantly, we estimated RH-use with all measures previously employed in the 
relevant literature (described in section 3) showing that stability in RH-use is not tied to 
statistical peculiarities of a single measurement tool (cf. Kantner & Lindsay, 2012). On 
the whole, we found temporal and cross-situational stability in RH-use similar in size 
compared to studies on other trait-like variables in judgment and decision making (e.g., 
Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014; Odum, 2011; Scheibehenne 
& Pachur, 2015; Witkin, Goodenough, & Karp, 1967). Specifically, as expected based 
on the review by Hilbig (2010), the adherence rate and the index c tended to 
overestimate stability in RH-use compared to the latent-trait r-model. In contrast, the DI 
and the index d’ tended to underestimate it. This again shows the superiority of the 
latent-trait r-model compared to the remaining measures of RH-use. 
Equally important, our results might also explain the difficulties to find 
dispositional determinants of RH-use. Aside from a small number of studies reporting 
such difficulties (e.g., Michalkiewicz, Coolin, & Erdfelder, 2013; Michalkiewicz, 
Hilbig, Erdfelder, Keller, & Bless, 2012; Pachur et al., 2009), it is highly probable that 
an even larger number of unpublished studies exists that show either inconclusive 
results or null-effects with regard to determinants of RH-use (cf. Appelt et al., 2011; 
Rosenthal, 1979). An attempt to explain these problems is based on the notion that the 
size of potential associations between RH-use and individual traits is limited by the size 
of stability in RH-use (cf. Mischel, 1968). In particular, the correlation between a 
powerful personality predictor and RH-use should not be expected to exceed the 
correlation between two tasks measuring RH-use, that is, stability in RH-use. 
Consequently, the correlation between a weak predictor and RH-use will be even lower 
and may be hardly detectable. Hence, the above described problems might be partly due 
to the investigation of weak predictors. So, the search for determinants of RH-use 
should be restricted to presumably powerful and theoretically well founded predictors, 
as already outlined in section 2.4. 
At this point it should be noted that we could rule out a severe objection against 
our findings, namely that stability in RH-use is only an epiphenomenon of stability in 
individual recognition or knowledge validities. To reiterate, it has repeatedly been 
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shown that higher recognition validity leads to more RH-use, whereas more valid 
knowledge leads to less RH-use (see section 2.2). Therefore, one might hypothesize 
that stability in RH-use is caused by stable underlying differences in individual 
recognition and knowledge validities. To rule out this objection, we demonstrate 1) that 
stability in recognition and knowledge validities were both either comparable in size or 
even smaller than stability in RH-use; 2) that the correlation between RH-use and 
recognition or knowledge validity, respectively, was not reliable across individuals in 
nearly all studies; and 3) that stability in RH-use was not affected by partialling out the 
effect of recognition and knowledge validity, respectively. These results suggest that 
RH-use truly reflects a specific style of decision making. Now that stability is shown, I 
turn to the investigation of individual determinants of RH-use.  
 
 
4.2. Intelligence and Adaptive RH-Use 
 
Michalkiewicz, M., Arden, K., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Do smarter people make better 
decisions? The influence of intelligence on adaptive use of the recognition 
heuristic. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
 
“Successful decision making requires the selection of strategies that match the specific 
characteristics of the current decision task as well as the resources available to the 
decision maker.” (Pachur et al., 2009, p. 902) 
 
On the one hand, it has repeatedly been shown that decision makers successfully 
adapt their decision strategies to the situation, as outlined in section 2.2. On the other 
hand, it has consistently been found that individuals differ with respect to strategy 
selection, as shown in section 2.3. But one important question remained largely 
unanswered so far: Do individuals systematically differ in their ability to successfully 
adapt their decision strategies to different situations? And if so, which cognitive, 
demographic, or personality factors might explain these differences? 
To answer these questions, we investigated intelligence as a potential 
determinant of adaptive RH-use. This idea is derived from the notion that intelligence 
represents the general cognitive capacity responsible for successful adaptation (e.g., 
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Neisser et al., 1996; Sternberg & Salter, 1982). Additionally, we studied whether fluid 
and crystallized intelligence – the two major factors of general intelligence - offer an 
explanation for this effect. To illustrate, fluid intelligence has been conceived as the 
capability to understand complex relationships and to solve new problems (Horn & 
Cattell, 1966). Thus, fluid intelligence might affect the capability to analyze the 
environmental structure, that is, the size of the recognition and knowledge validities, 
and to select the most appropriate decision strategy accordingly, that is, RH-use versus 
knowledge integration. Crystallized intelligence reflects skills and expertise acquired 
through personal experience (Horn & Cattell, 1966). In this way, crystallized 
intelligence might also affect the ability to understand the fit between the 
environmental structure and the corresponding decision strategies. However, this effect 
will probably depend on whether or not an individual possesses prior task knowledge or 
experience with similar decision situations (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987; Chi, Glaser, & 
Farr, 1988; Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007). In sum, both fluid and crystallized 
intelligence may affect successful adaptation to the decision context. Indeed, there is 
already initial evidence for effects of fluid and crystallized intelligence on adaptive 
heuristic use (Bröder, 2003; Mata et al., 2007; Pachur et al., 2009). 
To this end, we first investigated a situation where the RH outperformed 
knowledge integration in terms of validity. Therefore, we reanalyzed the study by 
Hilbig (2008) that assessed general intelligence (among others) as a potential 
confounding variable when assessing the effect of neuroticism on RH-use. Second, we 
conducted an experiment comprising two conditions: one condition where knowledge 
integration outperformed RH-use in terms of validities as opposed to the situation 
investigated by Hilbig (2008), and a second condition where both strategies were 
equally well adapted to the decision context in terms of validities. Here, intelligence 
was assessed in terms of fluid and crystallized intelligence. On the whole, we expected 
intelligence to increase use of the smarter, meaning the more valid, strategy in case it is 
determined by the decision context. In contrast, we expected no influence of 
intelligence when the decision context is indifferent. Additionally, we analyzed whether 
this effect is mainly driven by fluid or crystallized intelligence. 
In line with our hypotheses, in Hilbig’s (2008) experiment general intelligence 
was positively associated with RH-use when the RH outperformed knowledge 
integration. Conversely, in our experiment, RH-use was negatively associated with 
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fluid intelligence when knowledge integration outperformed RH-use. In contrast, we 
found no reliable association between fluid intelligence and RH-use when both 
strategies were equally valid. However, crystallized intelligence could not be shown to 
influence adaptive RH-use in our study. In sum, our results suggest that intelligence, 
specifically fluid intelligence, moderates adaptivity in RH-use. 
Notably, there are limitations to our study that could be responsible for the null-
effect of crystallized intelligence. First, we used a test of crystallized intelligence that is 
designed for the general population and not specifically tailored to student samples. 
This might explain the somewhat limited range of crystallized intelligence in our 
student sample that perhaps contributed to the smaller effects for this intelligence 
measure. Second and related to this issue, the selected sample might have been too 
homogeneous to find a correlation, that is, the variance in intelligence was not 
sufficient in size. Third, one might argue that the tests that we applied to assess 
crystallized intelligence did not capture those aspects of crystallized intelligence which 
affect adaptive strategy selection (cf. Beauducel, Liepmann, Felfe, & Nettelnstroth, 
2007). Fourth, it is possible that the inference tasks that we used were too artificial to 
elicit use of knowledge and skills acquired through everyday experience. All these 
aspects might have contributed to the small effect of crystallized intelligence.  
Note that while the decision context did not favor any strategy, that is, neither 
knowledge nor the RH, we found a weak positive association between knowledge-use 
and fluid intelligence, at least descriptively. In other words, we found that more 
intelligent decision makers preferred knowledge-use over RH-use in this situation 
although there was no situation-related reason for such a preference. There is one factor 
which might offer a reasonable explanation for this finding, namely, need for cognition 
(NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). NFC is defined as the extent to which people engage 
in and enjoy cognitively demanding activities. In fact, one might argue that intelligent 
people prefer the more complex and cognitively demanding strategy of knowledge 
integration over simple RH-use because they like to engage in cognitively demanding 
activities and enjoy use of cognitively demanding decision strategies. Corroborating 
this idea, a positive correlation between (fluid) intelligence and NFC has repeatedly 
been reported in the literature (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; 
Fleischhauer et al., 2010; Furnham & Thorne, 2013; Hill et al., 2013; von Stumm, 
2013). These ideas are further elaborated in the following section. 
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4.3. Need for Cognition, Faith in Intuition, and RH-Use 
 
Michalkiewicz, M., Minich, B., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Explaining individual 
differences in fast-and-frugal decision making: The impact of need for cognition 
and faith in intuition on use of the recognition heuristic. Manuscript submitted 
for publication. 
 
“Individuals seem to have personal tendencies that favor the use of compensatory or 
non-compensatory decision strategies, which are based on personality traits [...].” 
 (Shiloh, Koren, & Zakay, 2001, p. 701)  
 
In the following, I address the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (Epstein et 
al., 1996). This theory represents a plausible theoretical framework for deriving 
predictions on decision makers’ propensities to rely on fast-and-frugal versus 
cognitively demanding strategies (cf. Appelt et al., 2011; Mohammed & Schwall, 
2009), in this case, RH-use versus knowledge integration. According to the Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory, individuals can make use of two systems of information 
processing, which are independent but can work simultaneously. The analytic-rational 
system is assumed to operate through reasoning, formal logic, and abstract thought. 
Thus, it is expected to be slow and effortful. The intuitive-experiential system, by 
contrast, is assumed to operate through personal experience, categorical thinking, and 
concrete examples. So, it is expected to be fast and effortless. The theory predicts that 
in practice everybody uses both processing systems depending on the situation and the 
decision task at hand, but has a preference for one of them (e.g., Phillips et al., 2016).  
Preferences for or against these two systems of information processing can be 
assessed by means of two independent personality traits (Epstein et al., 1996): need for 
cognition (NFC) and faith in intuition (FII). NFC is defined as the extent to which a 
person likes to engage in effortful cognitive tasks, while FII is defined as the extent to 
which a person trusts in her or his intuitive feelings and immediate impressions. Indeed, 
there is already evidence that high NFC is associated with less use of certain heuristics, 
like the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Carnevale, Inbar, & Lerner, 2011; Epley & 
Gilovich, 2006). In contrast, high FII has been shown to be associated with enhanced 
use of certain heuristics, like the ease-of-retrieval, the representativeness, and the 
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reinforcement heuristic (Alós-Ferrer & Hügelschäfer, 2012; Danziger, Moran, & 
Rafaely, 2006; Mahoney, Buboltz, Levin, Doverspike, & Svyantek, 2011). However, 
there is also evidence that these effects might not hold for all kinds of heuristic decision 
making (Bröder, 2012; Keller, Bohner, & Erb, 2000). 
Based on these insights, we hypothesized that NFC counteracts RH-use while 
FII fosters it. In particular, we investigated the effects of NFC and FII in two conditions 
in line with the idea of strong and weak decision situations (Mischel, 1973; see also 
Lozano, 2016). In the strong condition the RH outperformed knowledge integration in 
terms of validity, whereas in the weak condition both strategies were equally well 
adapted to the decision context. We investigated the strong condition because it 
resembles the standard set-up used in most studies on the RH. Here, the bias towards 
RH-use might interfere with potential effects of personality and thereby hamper 
detection of such effects. In contrast, the weak condition was not biased towards any of 
the decision strategies. By implication, it should facilitate detection of potential effects 
of NFC and FII on strategy selection. By this means, we were able to interpret whether 
potential effects are only small (i.e., visible only in the weak condition) or can be 
considered substantial (i.e., persisting also in the strong condition). 
As expected, we found a negative effect of NFC in both conditions. Notably, the 
effect was very similar in size across conditions. In other words, the negative effect of 
NFC became apparent not only in the weak condition, where situational influences are 
minimal, but also in the strong condition, where situational influences are high. This 
suggests that NFC can be considered a powerful predictor of RH-use in the sense that it 
was not reduced by situational influences (Lozano, 2016). In particular, the effect of 
NFC can be interpreted as high compared to the test-retest correlations found by 
Michalkiewicz and Erdfelder (2016).  
Contrary to our expectations, our results do not show evidence for a positive 
effect of FII. This lack of evidence does not seem to be particularly uncommon, 
suggesting that the association between FII and the preference for heuristic use is less 
clear than predicted by Epstein et al. (1996) (e.g., Betsch & Glöckner, 2010; Keller et 
al., 2000; Pachur & Spaar, 2015). Apart from that, there are also alternative 
explanations for this lack of evidence. First, the effect of FII might have been too small 
to be detected within a relatively homogenous sample of students. Corroborating this 
idea, the range of FII scores was quite limited in our study. This might have resulted in 
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an underestimation of the true underlying effect of FII. Second, the effect of NFC was 
potentially masking the effect of FII. In line with this explanation, NFC was rather high 
in our study, whereas the FII value was rather low compared to previous studies (e.g., 
Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Finally, it has been shown that decision 
makers tend to apply an intuitive strategy when they have substantial experience with a 
decision situation (e.g., Betsch, 2008; Pachur & Marinello, 2013), which might not 
have been the case in our experiment.  
At this point, I would like to discuss our results in light of the experiment by 
Hilbig, Scholl, and Pohl (2010). When investigating the situational effect of processing 
modes, Hilbig, Scholl, and Pohl (2010) found that participants who were instructed to 
think deliberately applied the RH more often compared to those who were instructed to 
think intuitively. By contrast, we assessed the effect of processing styles as an 
individual predisposition and found the opposite pattern, namely that those preferring a 
deliberate processing style used the RH less often. The following line of thoughts might 
reconcile these opposed findings: Individuals who were instructed to use deliberate 
processing but principally favor intuitive processing may have been unable to cope with 
the cognitive effort inherent in knowledge integration (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; 
Phillips et al., 2016). Therefore, they probably tried to compensate this cognitive effort 
by using a less demanding strategy, that is, the RH. In contrast, individuals who were 
instructed to use intuitive processing but principally prefer deliberate processing may 
have avoided applying the RH. Instead, they probably used their knowledge because 
they enjoy working on cognitively demanding tasks and also enjoy the cognitive effort 
associated with information integration (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). One could assume 
that the result observed by Hilbig, Scholl, and Pohl (2010) may be due to a subsample 
of participants low in NFC. Unfortunately, since measures of NFC were not assessed in 
their study, there is no way to directly test these speculations. 
On the whole, we found supportive evidence that NFC is negatively related to 
RH-use, in line with the idea that high NFC is associated with enhanced elaboration 
(Dole & Sinatra, 1998). However, we did not find converging evidence that FII is 
positively related to RH-use, contrary to our expectations that high FII is associated 
with affective and associative information processing (Zimmerman, Redker, & Gibson, 
2011). To conclude, NFC partly explains individual differences in RH-use irrespective 
of any influence of the decision context.   
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5. General Discussion and Outlook 
 
“It is an important quest to uncover the conditions and individual differences which 
foster or hamper application of simple one-cue strategies, such as the RH.” (Hilbig, 
2010, p. 282) 
 
The overarching aim of my thesis is to explain the large variation in decision 
strategy selection with respect to the adaptive toolbox, in particular to the RH. To this 
end, my thesis fulfills three major goals. The first is a methodological goal, namely, to 
establish a tool for assessing individual RH-use and its determinants. In fact, the quest 
for precise tests of the RH started a decade ago by Pachur and Hertwig (2006) and 
Hilbig and Pohl (2008), and was further pursued by Hilbig, Erdfelder, and Pohl (2010). 
These researchers all introduced more elaborate measures of RH-use than the simple 
adherence rate. However, until now, there was no method to assess the dispositional 
factors underlying individual differences in RH-use in an unbiased and straightforward 
way. Thus, in response to the call for precise measures, I extended the r-model (Hilbig, 
Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010). This model can not only be regarded as the standard method 
for investigating RH-use, but also serves as a fruitful foundation for other approaches 
analyzing different aspects of the RH (e.g., Castela et al., 2014; Heck & Erdfelder, in 
press). In particular, I created a hierarchical measurement model based on Klauer’s 
(2010) latent-trait approach to MPT models, representing state of the art methodology. 
Specifically, this model allows less error-prone estimation of RH-use than previous 
methods. Moreover, it enables identification of the individual traits that explain 
variation in RH-use. Thus, researchers are now equipped with a helpful tool for 
assessing individual-level RH-use and its determinants. 
My second goal, which is more of a theoretical nature, is the demonstration of 
temporal and cross-situational stability in RH-use. In fact, stability represents an 
essential precondition in any investigation of individual differences (Aminoff et al., 
2012; Couch & Keniston, 1960; Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014; Odum, 2011; 
Scheibehenne & Pachur, 2015; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2008; Witkin et al., 1967). 
Specifically, within the adaptive toolbox, the need for stability assessment has been 
pointed out by Bröder and Newell (2008). Only if stability in RH-use can be shown, it 
will be possible to find substantial and replicable relations to individual trait variables. 
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In sum, by demonstrating temporal and cross-situational stability, my work provides the 
theoretical basis for the research on the dispositional determinants of RH-use. 
The third is an empirical goal, which builds on the former two. Equipped with 
the appropriate method and after demonstrating that there is stability in RH-use, it is 
possible to investigate the effects of individual traits on RH-use (and also the 
interaction of individual traits with the decision context). The importance of this quest 
has been emphasized by both the decision making field (e.g., Payne et al., 1993) and 
personality psychology (e.g. Funder, 2001). In brief, I demonstrate that RH-use is not 
only influenced by properties of the decision task and the decision context, but also by 
individual cognitive and personality traits. So, my work contributes to a new line of 
research that focuses on individual differences in RH-use and that aims at explaining 
these differences in terms of personality traits as well as in terms of personality-
situation interactions. 
A point of debate concerning my thesis might be the application of a model 
resting upon Bayesian parameter estimation. In particular, a common critique to 
Bayesian statistics is that it is based on prior beliefs. The prior distributions, 
representing these initial beliefs, are often supposed to be arbitrarily chosen and to 
strongly influence the results. To rule out the first objection, we applied priors that have 
been established by Matzke, Lee, and Wagenmakers (2013) and that have been 
repeatedly used (e.g., Arnold et al., 2015; Matzke et al., 2015). Also, we openly report 
our choice to enable all readers to draw their own conclusions independently. 
Contradicting the second objection, note that Bayesian parameter estimation has been 
shown not to be sensitive to the choice of the prior distributions as long as sufficiently 
informative data are available (e.g., Agresti, Caffo, & Ohman-Strickland, 2004; Matzke 
et al., 2015). Stated differently, enough data can minimize or even eliminate the 
influence of the chosen priors. Given the fairly large sample sizes (ranging between 70 
and 135 participants per study) and the large number of comparisons per individual 
(being 300 for all reported studies) we certainly met the criterion of relying on 
sufficiently informative data. Corroborating this assumption, a replication of the 
analyses with the basic r-model and standard correlation and regression methods 
showed the same patterns of results, only overall smaller in size. To conclude, both 
common objections to Bayesian statistics can be shown to be invalid here. 
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Where to go on from here? First of all, the reported studies should be repeated 
with more heterogeneous populations of participants than students. This endeavor is of 
special importance as we cannot show reliable effects of crystallized intelligence and 
FII on strategy selection. This lack of evidence might be due to the limited range of test 
scores in the homogeneous student samples. Arguing along the same lines, it is also 
possible that the effects of fluid intelligence and NFC are underestimated using student 
samples. Consequently, our effect sizes potentially only show lower bounds of the true 
effects with regard to the whole population. Use of more heterogeneous, thus more 
representative samples, would render the results more generalizable. 
As a second step, one could think of other determinants of RH-use, alone or in 
combination, as well as further interaction effects of individual traits with the decision 
context. However, one should not expect all cognitive and personality traits to be 
relevant predictors of strategy selection. It is therefore important to select individual 
traits that are theoretically well-grounded (e.g., Appelt et al., 2011; Mohammed & 
Schwall, 2009). First, it would be interesting to study the effect of fluid intelligence and 
NFC in combination because relations between these two factors have repeatedly been 
demonstrated (as summarized in section 4.2). This way, we could find out if one of the 
effects is influenced or even explained by the other. Apart from this, impulsivity seems 
to be a reasonable predictor of RH-use, as impulsivity and RH-use are both associated 
with fast decision making (e.g., Brunas-Wagstaff, Bergquist, & Wagstaff, 1994; 
Dickman & Meyer, 1988; Mann, 1973; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Pachur et al., 2009; 
Volz et al., 2006). Even if impulsivity by itself has not been shown to predict use of the 
TTB heuristic (Bröder, 2012), and might consequently also show no influence use of 
the RH, a context condition such as time pressure may turn it into one. This would be in 
line with the idea that certain personality traits possibly reveal their influence only 
under certain context conditions (e.g., Appelt et al., 2011; Mohammed & Schwall, 
2009) – similar to the effect of intelligence shown in section 4.2. Extending the idea of 
traits and corresponding situational contexts, one could examine the effect of 
neuroticism in more depth. In particular, Hilbig (2008) suggested that subjects high in 
neuroticism prefer RH-use over knowledge-use to avoid a diagnostic test of their 
abilities. If this assumption holds, increasing the personal relevance of the task may 
boost the effect of neuroticism. These ideas represent only a small extract and certainly 
more could be listed. 
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An important third step would be transferring the results to other fast-and-frugal 
heuristics. For instance, the TTB heuristic and the RH share recognition information as 
the basis for decisions. In fact, the RH even represents a building block of TTB. As a 
consequence, the results found here should also account for the TTB heuristic. 
However, note that the investigation of personality determinants of TTB has shown to 
be difficult (e.g., Bröder, 2012). One explanation might be that there are no 
measurement models of the TTB heuristic that estimate the probability of TTB-use. 
Until now, only classification methods exist that group individuals into users of TTB 
versus users of other strategies on the basis of their decision patterns. Thus, more 
elaborate methods are needed before starting this line of research. Another explanation 
might be that stability in use of TTB, an important precondition, has not been 
demonstrated yet. It seems likely that use of the TTB heuristic will be stable to a similar 
degree as use of the RH. However, as the TTB heuristic is more complex than the RH, 
without empirical tests we cannot be sure that individuals will indeed show stable 
propensities to rely on this strategy. Beyond that, transferring the results to even more 
extensive decision strategies involving the RH principle will probably also reveal 
problems. Certainly, this will require additional theoretical and empirical work.  
Finally, it would be interesting to test whether the preference for RH-use is 
associated with certain response tendencies and biases typically found in judgment and 
decision making. A temporal and cross-situational stable preference for certain decision 
strategies in combination with a liability to certain response tendencies and biases could 
then be interpreted as evidence for a general heuristic decision-making style (Kantner 
& Lindsay, 2012). Picking up this idea, it would be interesting to explore if there is any 
individual trait variable, which manifests not only in a preference for the RH but also 
for other heuristics, response tendencies and biases.  
To conclude, my thesis represents not only an important step in developing 
methods for analyzing individual differences in RH-use but also an important step in 
uncovering their sources. Thus, my thesis broadens our understanding of the RH by 
adding to a comprehensive framework that incorporates situational and individual 
determinants of strategy use, as well as their interaction. Thereby, it hopefully inspires 
future work on individual differences in strategy selection, their contextual and 
dispositional determinants, and the methods used to accomplish these tasks within the 
theory of the adaptive toolbox and beyond.  
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Individual differences in use of the recognition heuristic are stable
across time, choice objects, domains, and presentation formats
Martha Michalkiewicz1 & Edgar Erdfelder1
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Abstract The recognition heuristic (RH) is a simple decision
strategy that performs surprisingly well in many domains.
According to the RH, people decide on the basis of recogni-
tion alone and ignore further knowledge when faced with a
recognized and an unrecognized choice object. Previous re-
search has revealed noteworthy individual differences in RH
use, suggesting that people have preferences for using versus
avoiding this strategy that might be causally linked to cogni-
tive or personality traits. However, trying to explain differ-
ences in RH use in terms of traits presupposes temporal and
cross-situational stability in use of the RH, an important pre-
requisite that has not been scrutinized so far. In a series of four
experiments, we therefore assessed the stability in RH use
across (1) time, (2) choice objects, (3) domains, and (4) pre-
sentation formats of the choice objects. In Experiment 1, par-
ticipants worked on the same inference task and choice objects
twice, separated by a delay of either one day or one week.
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 using two different ob-
ject sets from the same domain, whereas Experiment 3
assessed the stability of RH use across two different domains.
Finally, in Experiment 4 we investigated stability across ver-
bal and pictorial presentation formats of the choice objects.
For all measures of RH use proposed so far, we found strong
evidence for both temporal and cross-situational stability in
use of the RH. Thus, RH use at least partly reflects a person-
specific style of decision making whose determinants await
further research.
Keywords Decisionmaking . Individual differences .
Cognitive trait . Multinomial processing treemodels .
Hierarchical Bayesianmodeling
Which city is more populous: Tokyo or Busan? If you recog-
nize Tokyo but not Busan, you can use a simple inference
strategy: the fast-and-frugal recognition heuristic (RH; Gold-
stein & Gigerenzer, 2002). According to the RH, a person
should choose the recognized object and ignore any further
knowledge. Thus, when following the RH, you would choose
Tokyo simply because you recognize it. Alternatively, you can
deliberately integrate knowledge available over and above
recognition—for instance, that Tokyo has an international air-
port and that cities with an international airport are (most
often) more populous. In this case, you would arrive at the
same conclusion with both decision strategies. However,
which factors are responsible for using the RH versus integrat-
ing further knowledge?
There is a large body of research on the situational deter-
minants of RH use. In general, RH use increases, the greater
the importance of a quick decision (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl,
2012; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006) and the higher the validity of
the recognition cue (Castela, Kellen, Erdfelder, & Hilbig,
2014; Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010; Pachur, Mata, &
Schooler, 2009; Pohl, 2006; Scheibehenne & Bröder, 2007).
By contrast, integration of further knowledge increases as
knowledge becomes more easily available and easier to inte-
grate (Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011;
Hilbig, Michalkiewicz, Castela, Pohl, & Erdfelder, 2015;
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Hilbig, Pohl, & Bröder, 2009; Newell & Fernandez, 2006;
Richter & Späth, 2006). In sum, it is quite well established
that participants adjust their RH use according to situational
factors (for reviews, see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011;
Pachur, Todd, Gigerenzer, Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011; Pohl,
2011).
However, studies that have addressed situational factors
have also revealed large individual differences in RH use
(Hilbig & Richter, 2011; Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler,
Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 2010; Newell & Shanks, 2004;
Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008). As was argued by
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009, p. 133), “in virtually every
task we find individual differences in strategies.”
Figure 1 displays the individual proportions of RH use on
the basis of data fromHilbig and Pohl (2009, Exp. 1), assessed
with the r-model (Hilbig et al., 2010) that we will describe in
detail below. Why would RH use differ to such a degree be-
tween participants under constant context conditions? As is
indicated by the standard errors illustrated in Fig. 1, the ob-
served heterogeneity is too large to be attributable to error
variance only. In fact, a goodness-of-fit test of the homogene-
ity hypothesis that all 24 individual proportions of RH use are
equal reveals a clear misfit [ΔG2(23) = 72.8, p < .001]. This
suggests that the heterogeneity might reflect individual pref-
erences for certain strategies that are not determined by the
context. This, in turn, gives rise to the question: Do individual
traits underlie RH use?
Indeed, there is some evidence that different groups of
people prefer different strategies. In particular, Pachur et al.
(2009) showed that elderly people use the RHmore often than
young adults do (see also Horn, Pachur, & Mata, 2015). Ex-
tending this line of research to the life span, Pohl, von
Massow, and Beckmann (2015) detected a nonmonotonic
trend in RH use in younger age groups: Preadolescent
children and young adults used the RH about equally often,
whereas adolescents used it more frequently. Moreover,
exploring a different source of individual differences, Hilbig
and Pohl (2008) found that more knowledgeable people tend
to rely less on the RH. These examples show that groups of
individuals may differ significantly from each other in RH use
even if the decision context is kept constant. In addition, at
least one study successfully examined the relationship be-
tween RH use and personality traits: Hilbig (2008) demon-
strated that neuroticism was positively related to RH use. Re-
sults like this one encourage a search for traits as sources of
individual differences in RH use.
However, considerable evidence also shows how difficult it
is to find associations between strategy use and individual
traits. For instance, apart from neuroticism, Hilbig (2008) also
investigated agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and
extraversion, but did not find any substantial effect on RH use.
Similarly, Pachur et al. (2009) tested associations between
measures of inhibitory control and RH use without finding
evidence for substantial correlations. Furthermore, Bröder
(2012) summarized multiple studies on the take-the-best heu-
ristic (TTB; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999) and various cog-
nitive and personality traits. Only intelligence was found to
affect adaptive use of the TTB heuristic, depending on the
environmental payoff structure (see also Bröder, 2003). Nota-
bly, none of the remaining variables covered by Bröder’s
(2012) review, including need for cognition, impulsivity, and
the Big Five personality traits, showed any substantial
relation.
Given the equivocal evidence on traits as determinants of
decision strategy use, we argue that prior to trying to explain
variability in RH use in terms of cognitive or personality traits,
an important precondition should be checked: stability in use
of the RH. The need for stability assessment has previously
been pointed out by Bröder and Newell (2008, p. 208): “It is
yet an open question whether the different strategy prefer-
ences diagnosed in a one-shot assessment of an experiment
will turn out to be stable across tasks and situations.” If RH
use turns out to be stable, it makes sense to search for relations
between RH use and individual traits. If, in contrast, stability
cannot be shown—that is, if RH use varies haphazardly within
individuals across situations, then it will hardly be possible to
find replicable relations between RH use and cognitive or
personality traits. Of course, stability does not imply that each
individual behaves identically in all situations—that is, ex-
hibits exactly the same level of RH use everywhere. Rather,
it means that individual behavior is “meaningfully consistent”
(Roberts, 2009, p. 139)—for example, that participants show-
ing higher than average RH use in one decision context will
also tend to show higher than average RH use in a second
context.
Notably, several studies have already emphasized stabil-
ity in behaviors related to judgment and decision making.
Thus, evidence suggesting the stability of RH use would fit
nicely into related lines of research. For instance, Witkin,
Fig. 1 Individual proportions of RH use per participant for the data from
Hilbig and Pohl (2009, Exp. 1). RH use is estimated via the r parameter of
the r-model (Hilbig et al., 2010) using multiTree (Moshagen, 2010) and
ordered by size. Error bars illustrate standard errors.
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Goodenough, and Karp (1967) showed that the ability to
ignore the visual context in perceptual judgments—known
as field independence—is a stable cognitive style from
childhood to young adulthood, at least. Furthermore,
Couch and Keniston (1960) investigated acquiescence bias
in terms of consistency over time and generality over tests.
More recently, Kantner and Lindsay (2012, 2014) found
response bias in recognition tasks to be stable across time,
stimulus materials, and item presentation formats.
Similarly, Aminoff and colleagues (2012) demonstrated
stability in criterion shifting in recognition memory across
different presentation formats. Furthermore, Odum (2011)
reanalyzed prior studies on delay discounting, and the re-
sults suggested stability across time for up to one year
using many different stimulus materials.
Recently, the focus has been shifted to systematic tests of
parameter stability of cognitive models. For instance,
Yechiam and Busemeyer (2008) evaluated the stability of sev-
eral learning models for repeated choice problems across dif-
ferent tasks. Also, Glöckner and Pachur (2012) examined pa-
rameter stability with respect to cumulative prospect theory
across time (see also Scheibehenne & Pachur, 2015). These
are just some examples of stability research, and many more
could be listed.
Following a route similar to those in the studies outlined
above, we will analyze four different aspects of stability—
namely, stability across (1) time, (2) choice objects, (3) do-
mains, and (4) presentation formats. For this purpose, we con-
ducted four experiments in which participants completed two
sets of inference tasks. Stability was measured as the test–
retest correlation between RH use in Tests 1 and 2. In Exper-
iment 1, we assessed stability across time for delays of one day
versus one week, using exactly the same choice objects in
both tests. Experiment 2 was designed to replicate Experiment
1. This time, however, different choice objects were drawn
from the same domain on the two tests, providing for an as-
sessment of stability across disjoint sets of objects. To further
analyze the influence of the choice materials, we conducted
Experiment 3, in which we assessed the stability of RH use
across different domains. Finally, to examine stability across
presentation formats, we designed Experiment 4, in which we
used names versus pictures as formats of object presentation.
Note that, in all four experiments, we specifically opted to
investigate stability factors that are unconfounded with the
overall level of RH use. Investigating the same people
twice—even when using different materials or presentation
formats—is usually assumed not to affect the overall level of
RH use, provided that the recognition and knowledge
validities do not differ between tests. To the degree that we
succeeded in implementing these conditions, we expected nei-
ther main effects of situational factors nor interaction effects
with individual factors on RH use, enabling us to assess the
influence of individual differences without confounds.
General method
When investigating stability in use of the RH, it is important to
ensure that both strategies under consideration—the RH and
knowledge use—are applicable in the current context. For this
purpose, several conditions must be fulfilled. First, participants
must recognize at least one, and at most all but one, of the
objects in order to apply the RH in the first place. Optimally,
participants should recognize half of the objects tomaximize the
proportion of cases in which the RH can be applied. Second,
participants must obviously have some kind of knowledge
about the set of objects and the question of interest. If nothing
but recognition information is available, participants obviously
cannot apply more elaborated strategies incorporating further
knowledge. Third, the validity of the recognition cue α (i.e.,
the proportion of cases in which choosing the recognized object
leads to a correct response) and the validity of knowledge β (i.e.,
the proportion of cases in which the application of knowledge
leads to a correct response) should both be greater than chance.
These conditions render both the RH and the use of knowledge
reasonable strategies. When selecting the materials for our ex-
periments, we aimed at satisfying all of these requirements.
To analyze our data, we primarily relied on the r-model
(Fig. 2; Hilbig et al., 2010), a multinomial processing tree
model (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009)
tailored to measure RH use, as defined by Goldstein and
Gigerenzer (2002). Specifically, if exactly one object is recog-
nized, participants will either apply the RH with probability r
or make use of further knowledge with probability 1 – r. We
focused on this model because it successfully decontaminates
the probability of RH use from the effects of knowledge-based
strategies that might also lead to choice of the recognized
object (see Hilbig, 2010).
In the present analyses, we applied the latent-trait approach to
multinomial processing tree models (Klauer, 2010) because it
elegantly handles variability in parameters between individuals.
For this purpose, we constructed a hierarchical version of the r-
model (Fig. 3) based on the implementation by Matzke, Dolan,
Batchelder, andWagenmakers (2015) and extended it to account
for the data of two test occasions simultaneously. Compared to
standard correlational analyses, the latent-trait approach has one
main advantage (Klauer, 2010;Matzke et al., 2015): It allows for
the joint estimation of model parameters and the correlations
between parameters in a single step. The estimated correlations
are thus automatically adjusted for the uncertainty in the individ-
ual parameter estimates; that is, the model estimates the correla-
tion of the true scores decontaminated from error influences. For
a comprehensive introduction to hierarchical models and their
advantages, see, for instance, Lee and Wagenmakers (2013).
Extension of the single-test hierarchical r-model to a two-
test version is straightforward. We estimated the parameters of
this extended model within the Bayesian framework usingMar-
kov chain Monte Carlo sampling employing OpenBUGS
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(Lunn, Spiegelhalter, Thomas, & Best, 2009) through
R2WinBUGS (Sturtz, Ligges, & Gelman, 2005).1 For each
analysis, we ran three chains with 500,000 iterations each, using
a thinning rate of 10, and discarded the first 100,000 iterations
as a burn-in period. Chain convergence was reached for all
estimated parameters (R < 1.01; Gelman, Carlin, Stern, &
Rubin, 2004). Also, the effective sample sizes were sufficient
to trust the parameter estimates (Kruschke, 2014).2 As is com-
mon practice in Bayesian analysis, we will report the means of
the posterior distributions together with their 95 % Bayesian
credible intervals (BCI). In particular,μr1 andμr2 are interpreted
as the group-level estimates of RH use on Test Occasions 1 and
2, respectively. On the basis of the covariance matrix Σ, the
standard deviations σr1 and σr2 as well as the correlations be-
tween parameters ρr1,r2 are derived. In this context, standard
deviations reflect the variation between participants, being close
to zero when participants are rather homogeneous and large
when there are substantial individual differences.
Experiment 1
To assess stability over time, we tested whether a given par-
ticipant would show similar levels of RH use for a set of
choice objects on two different points in time.
Method
Design and procedure To study the RH, we employed the
frequently used city-size task (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002;
Hilbig & Pohl, 2009; Pachur et al., 2008) including, in random
order, a paired-comparison task and a recognition task. In the
comparison task, participants were asked to decide for pairs of
cities which of the two cities was more populous. In the recog-
nition task, participants had to indicate for all cities whether or
not they had heard of the city before the experiment.
To test our hypothesis, participants were randomly assigned
to one of two groups and worked on the city-size task twice,
separated by a delay of either one day (day group) or one week
(week group). To render the procedures equivalent for both
groups, all participants completed three sessions—the initial
session and the two following sessions one day and one week
later—at exactly the same time of day. In Session 1, all partic-
ipants first worked on the city-size task and then completed two
unrelated experiments to render the intention of the study less
obvious. In Sessions 2 and 3, depending on the group, partici-
pants either worked on the city-size task for the second time or
again completed an unrelated experiment. To control for con-
tamination of the results, we asked participants two questions
after they had completed the city-size task for the second time:
(1) whether they had tried to memorize their responses in the
first session, and (2) whether they had looked up city sizes after
the first session. Participants received course credit or a flat fee
of €10 after (and only after) completion of all three sessions. We
refrained from using performance-contingent payment here, as
1 The R code, the model file, and a sample data set are provided in the
online supplemental materials.
2 Tomeet these criteria, we increased the number of iterations per chain to
1 million for the week group of Experiments 1 and 2 as well as for the
different group of Experiment 3.
Fig. 2 Illustration of the r-model. Displayed are the three object pairs that
can occur in a paired-comparison task: knowledge pairs (both objects
recognized), guessing pairs (neither object recognized), and recognition
pairs (exactly one object recognized). Participants’ responses are assigned
to eight categories and accounted for by four latent parameters—namely,
recognition validity (parameter a), knowledge validity (parameter b), the
probability of correct guessing (parameter g), and most importantly, the
probability of RH use (parameter r). Adapted from “One-Reason
Decision Making Unveiled: A Measurement Model of the Recognition
Heuristic,” by Hilbig et al. 2010, Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, p. 125. Copyright 2010 by the
American Psychological Association.
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is often done in this kind of task, because we were concerned
that this would encourage participants to look up the city sizes
between the first and second tests of the RH.
MaterialWe used exactly the same objects in both rep-
etitions of the city-size task. Specifically, we selected a
random sample of 100 cities from the 150 most popu-
lous US cities for the recognition tasks. From these
items, we randomly created one sample of 300 pairs
for the comparison tasks, ensuring that (1) each city
appeared exactly six times and (2) recognition and
knowledge validity were adequate to render both RH
use and knowledge use reasonable strategies to solve
the task. To achieve this, we selected the materials on
the basis of the data of pilot experiments on RH use
conducted in our lab3.
Participants A total of 70 student participants were recruited
via posters and mailing lists at the University of Mannheim.
Six participants dropped out of the experiment by not coming
back to the second or third session. The remaining 64 partic-
ipants consisted of 45 women and 19 men, between 18 and
30 years of age (M = 21.8 years, SD = 2.7). All participants
were native speakers or fluent in German.
Results and discussion
The recognition proportions, recognition validities, and
knowledge validities did not differ significantly between
groups [all ts(62) < 1.67, ps > .10, Bayes factors (BF10s) <
0.82].4 Therefore, the analyses related to these variables are
reported for both groups combined. As expected, the mean
recognition validity5 α and the mean knowledge validity6 β
showed that both strategies—the RH and knowledge use—
were clearly better than guessing (α = .77, SD = .06; β = .67,
SD = .08, and α = .77, SD = .06; β = .66, SD = .08, for Tests 1
and 2, respectively) [all ts(63) > 15.0, ps < .001, BF10s >
1,000]. Hence, the application of either of these strategies
was reasonable. Furthermore, participants in the initial session
recognized about half of the cities (M = 49.1 objects, SD =
11.4), resulting in a sufficient number of recognition cases.
Surprisingly, participants recognized more cities on the sec-
ond test of the RH (M = 58.6 objects, SD = 19.8) than on the
first [t(63) = 4.71, p < .001, BF10 > 1,000]. This was most
probably due to confusion of real recognition (i.e., cities seen
before the experiment) and familiarity induced by the presen-
tation of the cities in the initial session. Hence, since the rec-
ognition judgments collected on the second test were obvious-
ly biased, we based all measures on the recognition judgments
obtained in the first test only. However, using the original
recognition judgments of each session did not change the re-
sults substantially (see Table 2 in the Appendix).
To further control for possible confounds, we analyzed the
control questions. All participants confirmed that they had not
looked up the city sizes. This was validated by the numbers of
correct answers in the comparison tasks across the two tests:
3 The stimulus materials of all experiments are provided in the online
supplemental materials.
4 Bayes factors were computed using the BayesFactor R package
(Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) and interpreted fol-
lowing the classification by Jeffreys (1961).
5 Recognition validity is computed as the proportion of recognition pairs
where the recognized object represents the correct choice. It matches the
estimates for parameter a of the hierarchical r-model.
6 Knowledge validity is computed as the proportion of correct choices in
knowledge pairs. It matches the estimates for parameter b of the hierar-
chical r-model.
Fig. 3 Illustration of the single-test hierarchical latent-trait r-model (cf.
Matzke, Lee, &Wagenmakers, 2013). Displayed are the relations between
data and latent model parameters. Observable and unobservable variables
are presented as shaded versus unshaded nodes, respectively; discrete and
continuous variables are presented as squares versus circular nodes. To-be-
estimated and derived variables (which can be parameterized by means of
the remaining model parameters) are presented as single-bordered versus
double-bordered nodes. The plates indicate replications over I individuals
for the J = 3 object cases (knowledge, guessing, and recognition cases).
For each individual i and each object case j, the vector of category counts
kij follows a multinomial distribution with probability vector Θij and
number of observations nij, as is presented in the r-model (see Fig. 2).
The individual model parameters si (s ∈ {a, b, g, r}) are modeled in a
probit-transformed space, si← Φ(μ
s + ξs * δi
s), as linear combinations of
the group-level mean μs ~ N(0, 1), the multiplicative scale parameter ξs ~
U(0, 100), and the individual displacement parameter δi
s, drawn from a
common multivariate normal distribution with mean vector 0 and
covariance matrixΣ, with Σ–1 following a Wishart(I, 5) distribution.
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Indeed, we even found a slight decrease (M = 201.9 answers,
SD = 12.5, andM = 199.0 answers, SD = 13.1, for Tests 1 and
2, respectively) [t(63) = 2.66, p = .01, BF10 = 3.48]. Moreover,
only nine participants stated that they had tried to memorize
their answers during the initial session. Obviously, memoriz-
ing the answers to 300 questions, given only 1,351 ms per
question (i.e., the average response time across participants
and items in the comparison task), and retaining them for up
to one week is very unlikely. The actual answers confirmed
this: Participants decided differently on the second test than on
the first for up to half of the trials (M = 69.0, SD = 18.8, Min =
38, Max = 142). In sum, there was no indication that judg-
ments in the second comparison task were biased.
As expected, we found strong heterogeneity in RH use
between participants (μr1 = .77 [.74, .80], σr1 = .38 [.29,
.48], and μr2 = .70 [.66, .74], σr2 = .42 [.33, .53], for Tests 1
and 2, respectively). Unexpectedly, we observed a small de-
crease in the r parameter between the two test occasions (Δr =
.07 [.04, .10]), showing that participants used the RH slightly
less often in the second test than in the first. However, this
difference should not have influenced the core results, because
the correlation between RH use on Tests 1 and 2 is indepen-
dent of the mean level of RH use.
To test the main hypothesis, we examined the correlations
between the r parameter on Tests 1 and 2 for both groups
separately. Overall, we observed strong positive correlations
for both groups (ρr1,r2 = .80 [.56, .94], and ρr1,r2 = .71 [.39,
.91], for the day and week groups, respectively). The small
drop in correlations after an extended delay of one week was
not reliable, as can be seen by the overlapping BCIs. This
provided evidence in favor of our hypothesis that people used
the RH consistently across time.
To establish a benchmark against which to compare the sizes
of the correlations, we estimated the within-test correlation of
the r parameter for single tests. More precisely, we split the data
of each participant into the first and the last 150 trials. We then
estimated the correlations between the parameters of these two
parts using the hierarchical r-model. The magnitude of consis-
tency across tests was similar to that observed within a single
test ðρr1,r2 = .73 [.46, .91] on Test 1 and ρr1,r2 = .72 [.47, .89] on
Test 2), showing that the delay between task repetitions (0 h,
24 h, or 168 h) had little effect on the test–retest correlation. In
sum, the results reflect stability across time up to one week, at
least when using the same choice objects repeatedly.
A possible objection against Experiment 1 is that partici-
pants perhaps just behaved very similarly when working on
exactly the same task and choice objects twice. Why should
they change their judgments when facing the same choice
objects for the second time, perhaps even remembering (some
of) the choices they had made previously? To test whether
stability was caused by the invariance of materials only, we
conducted a second experiment using different objects in the
two inference tasks.
Experiment 2
Method
Design and procedure The design and procedure were iden-
tical to those of Experiment 1. Participants were again ran-
domly assigned to one of two groups and worked on the city-
size task twice: in the initial session and either one day (day
group) or one week (week group) after the initial session.
Material This time, two disjoint samples of 25 cities were
randomly drawn from the 61 most populous world cities
for the two recognition tasks. Each of the 25 cities was
exhaustively paired, resulting in two samples of 300 pairs
for the two comparison tasks. Because we wanted the two
iterations of the city-size task to closely resemble each
other except for object identity, we selected the materials
on the basis of the data of prior experiments (Hilbig et al.,
2010, 2012). Thereby, we made sure that both city sam-
ples had similar proportions of recognized objects, recog-
nition, and knowledge validities.
Participants A total of 94 student participants were recruited
via posters and mailing lists at the University of Mannheim.
Six participants completed the first session only, and thus
dropped out of the experiment. This resulted in 88 partici-
pants, consisting of 49 women and 39 men, between 18 and
59 years of age (M = 22.7 years, SD = 5.3). All participants
were native speakers or fluent in German.
Results and discussion
Five participants had to be excluded from the analyses be-
cause they recognized all of the objects or all but one. Because
group differences were again negligible [all ts(81) < 1.21, ps>
.23, BF10s < 0.43], the analyses of recognition rates, recogni-
tion validities, and knowledge validities were based on the
data of both groups combined. First, participants recognized
on average 17.3 cities (SD = 2.8) of Set 1 and 16.5 cities (SD =
1.8) of Set 2, resulting in sufficient recognition cases for both
sets. Second, the mean recognition and knowledge validities
showed that both strategies—the RH and further knowl-
edge—were appropriate—that is, better than guessing (α =
.69, SD = .08; β = .57, SD = .08, and α = .68, SD = .07; β =
.61, SD = .08, for Sets 1 and 2, respectively) [all ts(82) > 7.61,
ps < .001, BF10s > 1,000]. In sum, the materials were selected
in line with our goals.
Replicating Experiment 1, the r parameter, representing the
proportion of RH use, showed strong variability between par-
ticipants (μr1 = .59 [.51, .66], σr1 = .86 [.71, 1.03], and μr2 =
.73 [.66, .78], σr2 = .82 [.69, .99], for Tests 1 and 2, respec-
tively). Again, we observed a difference in the average r
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parameters between the two choice sets, this time opposite to
that in Experiment 1: Participants used the RH on average less
often in the first than in the second test (Δr = –.14 [–.20,
–.07]). As in Experiment 1, this difference should have im-
pacted stability only marginally.
To test the main hypothesis, we again examined the corre-
lations between the first and second tests of the RH for both
groups separately. The results showed very similar positive
correlations (ρr1,r2 = .54 [.26, .75] and ρr1,r2 = .53 [.25, .75]
for the day and week groups, respectively). This suggests that
RH use is stable across time even when the choice objects
differ in the two tests, ruling out the objection to Experiment
1 that stability is perhaps limited to exact replications of
choices.
Notably, the between-test correlations in Experiment 2
were lower than the within-test correlations (ρr1,r2 = .90 [.80,
.96] and ρr1,r2 = .91 [.83, .97] for the first and second tests,
respectively). The former also tended to be lower than the
between-test correlations observed in Experiment 1. This sug-
gests that consistency in RH use partly depends on the simi-
larity of (or overlap in) choice objects. To further study the
influence of differences in materials, we conducted a third
experiment in which we assessed the stability of RH use
across different domains.
Experiment 3
Method
Design and procedure Participants worked on two tests of
the RH (both consisting of a recognition task and a com-
parison task, in random order) within a single session. As
in Experiment 2, we used different materials on the two
tests of the RH. However, there was one important modi-
fication: The corresponding materials were drawn from
two different judgment domains. The experiment again
comprised two groups. In the related group, participants
worked on two different object sets drawn from similar
(although not identical) domains. In the different group,
in contrast, the two object sets were drawn from clearly
distinct domains. To maintain a high level of motivation
across the lengthy experiment, participants received
performance-contingent payment. In both comparison
tasks, participants gained €0.03 for each correct judgment,
whereas they lost €0.03 for each false judgment. However,
to avoid strategy-learning effects, participants received
feedback about their performance at the end of the exper-
iment only.
MaterialWe used different materials for the two groups. In the
related group, participants were asked to decide on (1) the
success of celebrities and (2) the success of movies, in random
order. The domain of celebrities consisted of the 100 most
successful celebrities according to the Forbes List 2012
(www.forbes.com), which defined success as entertainment-
related earnings plus media visibility. The domain of movies
contained the 100 most successful German movies, character-
ized by the numbers of cinemagoers in Germany. Analogously,
in the different group, participants were asked to decide on (1)
the size of islands and (2) the success of musicians, in random
order. The domain of islands included the 60 largest islands
worldwide, whereas the domain of musicians involved the
world’s 150 most successful musicians, characterized by the
numbers of records sold worldwide. To make sure that for both
groups the two choice sets had similar properties (i.e., propor-
tions of objects recognized, recognition, and knowledge
validities), objects were selected on the basis of the recognition
judgments of an independent prestudy. Specifically, we chose a
random sample of 25 objects for each of the four domains for
the recognition task. Each of these samples was then exhaus-
tively paired, resulting in 300 trials for the comparison task.
ParticipantsA total of 135 student participants were recruited
at the University of Mannheim and randomly assigned to one
of the two groups outlined above. The sample consisted of 87
women and 48 men, between 18 and 45 years of age (M =
21.6 years, SD = 3.6). All participants were native speakers or
fluent in German. They received an average salary of €3.70
(SD = 1.85).
Results and discussion
Three participants had to be excluded from the analyses be-
cause they recognized either all but one or none of the objects.
Descriptive analyses revealed that the materials were chosen in
line with our goals: Participants recognized on average 13.8
celebrities (SD = 3.3) and 15.4 movies (SD = 4.0), as well as
12.6 islands (SD = 2.6) and 16.0musicians (SD = 4.0), resulting
in sufficient numbers of recognition cases for all domains. In
the related group, the mean recognition and knowledge
validities did not differ across materials (α = .64, SD = .10; β
= .56, SD = .09, and α = .64, SD = .09; β = .56, SD = .10, for
celebrities andmovies, respectively) [all ts(67) < 0.35, ps> .72,
BF10s < 0.14). In the different group, the mean recognition
validities were similar for both domains (α = .68, SD = .08,
and α = .69, SD = .14, for islands and musicians, respectively)
[t(63) = 0.64, p = .53, BF10 = 0.17]. The difference in mean
knowledge validities was most probably due to the choice of
the materials being based on a small prestudy (β = .65, SD =
.08, and β = .60, SD = .08, for islands and musicians, respec-
tively) [t(63) = 3.94, p < .001, BF10 = 109.0]. Overall, the
recognition and knowledge validities showed that both strate-
gies—RH use and knowledge use—were reasonable [all ts(67)
> 4.63, ps < .001, BF10s > 1,000 for the related group; all ts(63)
> 10.5, ps < .001, BF10s > 1,000 for the different group].
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Again, we found strong heterogeneity in RH use between
participants in both groups (μr1 = .77 [.72, .82], σr1 = .68 [.56,
.83], and μr2 = .83 [.78, .86], σr2 = .63 [.50, .78], for celebrities
and movies, respectively; μr1 = .69 [.61, .76], σr1 = .84 [.68,
1.04], and μr2 = .82 [.76, .87], σr2 = .76 [.62, .95], for islands
and musicians, respectively). As before, the difference in
mean levels of RH use should not have influenced the
results in a crucial manner (Δr = –.05 [–.10, .001] and
Δr = –.13 [–.21, –.05], for the related and different groups,
respectively).
To test the main hypothesis, the correlations between RH
use in the two tasks were examined separately for each group.
Overall, the results showed medium to strong correlations for
both groups (ρr1,r2 = .42 [.18, .62] and ρr1,r2 = .33 [.08, .55], for
the related and different groups, respectively), thus supporting
the hypothesis of stability across domains. However, both cor-
relations were substantially lower than the within-test correla-
tions (ρr1,r2 = .81 [.66, .92] for celebrities and ρr1,r2 = .77 [.59,
.90] for movies; ρr1,r2 = .89 [.79, .96] for islands and ρr1,r2 = .81
[.65, .92] for musicians). These differences demonstrate a po-
tential impact of variation in domains. Also, there seems to be a
downward trend in the stability coefficients, as compared to the
results of Experiments 1 and 2.
In conclusion, the results of Experiments 1 to 3 support the
hypothesis that RH use is relatively stable when using the same
or different choice objects and also when using similar or clear-
ly distinct domains. However, they also support the conjecture
that the overall similarity of the to-be-compared decision sce-
narios impacts the stability of decision strategies across
domains.
Another important aspect of the choice context has not been
addressed so far: Experiments 1 to 3 presented choice options
in verbal form only. This is a rather abstract presentation format
relative to typical choice situations in everyday life. Does sta-
bility in RH use generalize to perceptually enriched, and pre-
sumably ecologically more valid, pictorial presentations of
choice objects? Experiment 4 was designed to address this
question.
Experiment 4
Method
Design and procedure Participants worked on two choice
tasks within one session using exactly the same materials but
different presentation formats. In the first task, the choice op-
tions were indicated verbally (i.e., using names), whereas in the
second task they were indicated pictorially (i.e., using photos),
or vice versa. Once again, participants received performance-
contingent payment to maintain a high motivational level
throughout the experiment, but they were informed about their
overall performance only after the whole experiment was
completed.
Material We used the names and pictures of the 100 most
successful celebrities according to the Forbes List 2012 as
choice options (cf. Exp. 3). For the recognition task, a subset
of 25 objects was randomly chosen without repetition. This set
was exhaustively paired, resulting in 300 pairs of objects for the
comparison task. To guarantee similar properties of the mate-
rials, we selected the objects on the basis of the recognition
judgments of an independent prestudy.
Participants A total of 87 student participants were recruited
via posters and mailing lists at the University of Mannheim.
The sample consisted of 58 women and 29 men, between 18
and 45 years of age (M = 22.3 years, SD = 4.7). All participants
were native speakers or fluent in German, and they received an
average salary of €3.19 (SD = 1.36).
Results and discussion
Descriptive analyses revealed that thematerials had been chosen
in line with our goals: Participants recognized on average about
half of the objects (M = 13.2 celebrities, SD = 3.7, presented as
names, and M = 12.5 celebrities, SD = 3.7, presented as pic-
tures), resulting in sufficient recognition cases. Similarly, the
actual mean recognition and knowledge validities showed that
both the RH and knowledge use were reasonable strategies un-
der both presentation formats (α = .64, SD = .10; β = .62, SD =
.09, and α = .65, SD = .10; β = .58, SD = .11, for names and
pictures, respectively) [t(86) > 6.75, p < .001, BF10 > 1,000].
As before, we found large individual differences in RH use,
irrespective of the presentation format (μr1 = .74 [.68, .79], σr1 =
.83 [.70, 1.00], and μr2 = .71 [.64, .77], σr2 = .84 [.70, 1.00], for
names and pictures, respectively; Δr = .03 [–.03, .09]). More
importantly, RH use was stable across presentation modes,
demonstrated by a strong positive correlation of ρr1,r2 =
.60 [.44, .74]. The within-test correlations were very sim-
ilar and considerably higher for each format (ρr1,r2 = .91
[.83, .96] and ρr1,r2 = .89 [.80, .95], for names and pic-
tures, respectively), relative to the correlations across pre-
sentation formats. Thus, stability in RH use appears to
depend, at least to a certain extent, on invariance of the
presentation formats.
Stability of alternative measures of RH use
To make sure that evidence on within-individual stability was
not tied to a particular measure (cf. Kantner & Lindsay, 2012) or
to statistical peculiarities of the r-model that might bias stability
assessment, we replicated the main analyses using all measures
of RH use previously employed in the relevant literature: the
adherence rate (i.e., the proportion of cases in which the recog-
nized object is chosen), the indices c (i.e., the tendency to follow
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the recognition cue) and d' (i.e., the ability to discriminate cases
in which recognition yields a correct vs. a false inference) de-
rived from signal detection theory (Pachur et al., 2009), and the
discrimination index (DI; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008), similar to the
discriminability parameterd'. For this purpose, we calculated the
respective measures for each participant and each test occasion
separately and used standard methods of stability assessment
(i.e., Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients), summa-
rized in Table 1.
Briefly, we found the same pattern of results as with the r-
model. In fact, the correlation coefficients for the adherence rate
and the index c were comparable in size to those for the r
parameter.7 However, the correlation coefficients for the indices
DI and d' are somewhat smaller. These indices have in common
that they capture the ability to discriminate cases in which the
RH leads to correct versus false inferences. As such, they mea-
sure the deviation from pure RH use. Uncontrolled noise fac-
tors—for instance, the overall degree of knowledge about the
domain—might affect the degree of deviation from perfect RH
use. Therefore, neither the lack of a linear relationship between
the r parameter and these two indices (Horn et al., 2015) nor the
lower within-test correlations (see Table 2 in the Appendix) and,
by implication, the lower stability of DI and d' come as a
surprise.
General discussion
When making decisions, people can use different strategies:
These include simple strategies like the fast-and-frugal recogni-
tion heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), which assumes
that decisions are based on recognition exclusively, and more
costly strategies such as the integration of knowledge stored in
memory, which demand more time and cognitive resources.
There are two general approaches to identifying factors that
influence strategy selection. On the one hand, a fertile line of
research focuses on external factors—that is, situational and
domain-specific variables (e.g., Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Hilbig
et al., 2010; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Richter & Späth, 2006).
On the other hand, a sparsely studied line of research has fo-
cused on internal factors, such as personality traits and other
persistent individual characteristics (e.g., Hilbig, 2008; Pachur
et al., 2009).
It has been shown repeatedly that people differ to a large
extent in applying specific strategies. This heterogeneity appears
to be caused by person-specific factors, independent of contex-
tual influences (e.g., Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Hilbig &
Richter, 2011; Pachur et al., 2008). Among others, Shiloh,
Koren, and Zakay (2001, p. 701) observed that “individuals
seem to have personal tendencies that favor the use of compen-
satory or non-compensatory decision strategies, which are based
on personality traits.” Consequently, research on personality in-
fluences is important because contextual aspects alone cannot
explain individual differences in strategy selection satisfactorily.
However, prior to exploring the personality determinants of RH
use, temporal and cross-situational stability in RH use needs to
be demonstrated as an important precondition. If people do not
apply the RH in a consistent way, it will eventually turn out to be
impossible to find replicable relations between RH use and in-
dividual traits.
For these reasons, we conducted four experiments to assess
four different aspects of stability in RH use—namely, stability
across (1) time, (2) choice objects, (3) domains, and (4) presen-
tation formats. In all four experiments, participants worked on
two tasks measuring RH use. The stability of RH use was
assessed as the cross-task correlation. To account for measure-
ment and sampling errors in individual parameter estimates of
RH use, we used a hierarchical extension of the r-model applied
to the two test occasions (Klauer, 2010; Matzke et al., 2015).
Moreover, to ensure that the results were not limited to a partic-
ular measure of RH use, we also evaluated stability for all mea-
sures of RH use previously employed in the relevant literature
(see Hilbig, 2010, for a review and comparative evaluation).
In Experiments 1 and 2, we assessed stability across time
using a delay of either one day or one week between the two
choice tasks. The only difference between the two experiments
was that we used exactly the same choice objects in both tasks in
Experiment 1 and different choice objects in Experiment 2. The
results of both experiments confirmed our hypothesis that RH
use is stable across time. To provide a benchmark against which
to compare the correlation coefficients, we estimated the within-
test correlation. To this end, we split the data into the first and
second 150 trials and estimated the correlations in RH use be-
tween these two parts for both test occasions separately. This
coefficient can be interpreted as the “baseline” stability8 for a
zero delay. In Experiment 1, the correlations of both groupswere
comparable to the within-test correlations in Tests 1 and 2. In
Experiment 2, the correlations across test occasions were some-
what lower than the within-test correlations. However, the
within-test correlations of Experiment 2 were based on exactly
the same stimulus materials, whereas the between-test correla-
tions were based on two distinct material sets. In sum, these
findings suggest that stability is largely unaffected by the time
7 The smaller correlations in the day group of Experiment 2 compared to
the week group are due to a single participant. Excluding this participant
resulted in correlation coefficients of .60 for the adherence rate and of .57
for the index c.
8 The within-test correlations are similar in size across Experiments 2–4,
where each object was repeated 24 times in the decision task. A slight
decrease was found for Experiment 1, where each object was repeated
only six times. This small number of repetitions might have caused a
difference in choice objects between the first and the second halves of
the decision task, resulting in a somewhat smaller within-test correlation
than in the experiments in which the same objects were repeated 24 times.
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interval between measurement occasions, but might be influ-
enced by differences in stimulus materials.
To study stability across the different materials, we system-
atically increased the differences in choice objects and domains
in Experiments 1 to 3. Participants worked repeatedly on exactly
the same choice objects in Experiment 1, on different choice
objects drawn from the same domain in Experiment 2, and on
objects from two distinct judgment domains that differed slight-
ly versus substantially in Experiment 3. Medium to strong sta-
bility in RH use was found in all experiments. However, the
stability coefficients tended to decrease when the differences
between tasks increased: The correlations were very high and
comparable to the within-test correlations when using exactly
the same objects in both tests. They were lower when using
different stimulus materials from the same object domain,
dropped again when using objects from slightly different do-
mains, and dropped even more when using objects from sub-
stantially different domains.
Finally, we examined stability across different presentation
formats in Experiment 4, in which we presented the choice
objects as names versus pictures. As before, RH use was rela-
tively stable across tasks. However, as compared to the within-
test correlations (which were similar for the two presentation
formats and in line with those in the other experiments), stability
was reduced slightly by a change in presentation formats.
One potential objection refers to the possibility that the ob-
served stability in RH use was perhaps nothing but an epiphe-
nomenon of stability in the participants’ knowledge. Hilbig and
Pohl (2009) have shown that more valid knowledge leads to
less use of the RH. Therefore, one might hypothesize that the
stability of RH use was caused by stable underlying differences
in knowledge validity, with individuals high in knowledge va-
lidity using the RH less often than those with low knowledge
validity. However, recall that we found stability across different
domains in Experiment 3. Assuming that knowledge validity is
domain-specific (i.e., uncorrelated between domains), cross-
domain stability in RH use indicates that this result cannot be
accounted for solely by stability in knowledge validity. Of
course, one could maintain that some aspects of knowledge
are perhaps domain-general, leading to positive knowledge cor-
relations between domains. For instance, people who have
more valid knowledge concerning the domain of celebrities
might also have more valid knowledge concerning movies.
However, at least three aspects of our results are inconsistent
with the idea that stability of RH use is caused by individual
differences in knowledge (see Tables 4 to 6 in the Appendix).
First, we found a reliable negative correlation between RH use
and knowledge validity for one group in Experiment 2 only.
Second, the retest correlations between knowledge validities
either were comparable in size to the retest correlations for
RH use or were even smaller and not reliable. Third, the corre-
lations between RH use on Tests 1 and 2 were very similar in
size to the partial correlations (partialing out the effect of
knowledgemeasured on Test 1 or 2, respectively), showing that
the stability of RH use is unaffected by individual differences in
knowledge.
Arguing along similar lines, one might hypothesize that
stability in RH use is perhaps an epiphenomenon of stability
in individual recognition validities. It has repeatedly been
shown that recognition validity differences between domains
are positively correlated with domain-specific RH use
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; Hilbig et al., 2010; Pachur
et al., 2011). However, we found no reliable positive relation
between individual RH use and the individual recognition
validities in any experiment (see Table 4). Also, stability in
RH use is unaffected by individual differences in recog-
nition validities, since the partial correlations closely
match the zero-order test–retest correlations (see
Table 6). Note that this result is not in direct conflict with
the previous studies cited above, because these studies
assessed recognition validity differences between domains,
whereas we investigated recognition validity differences
between individuals.
In sum, stability in RH use was found across time, choice
objects, domains, and presentation formats to a degree similar
to what has previously been found for some other trait-like
Table 1 Pearson correlation
coefficients (and 95% confidence
intervals) across the two tests of
the recognition heuristic (RH) for
all measures of RH use previously
employed in the relevant literature
Exp. Group Measure of RH Use
Adherence Rate c d' DI
1 Day group .90 [.81, .95] .86 [.73, .93] .47 [.15, .70] .39 [.05, .65]
Week group .72 [.49, .86] .70 [.46, .84] .51 [.19, .73] .52 [.20, .74]
2 Day group .45 [.17, .67] .48 [.20, .69] .12 [–.19, .41] .42 [.13, .64]
Week group .55 [.30, .73] .55 [.30, .73] .004 [–.30, .31] .23 [–.08, .50]
3 Related group .49 [.28, .65] .48 [.27, .65] .05 [–.19, .29] .05 [–.19, .29]
Different group .43 [.21, .61] .46 [.24, .63] .28 [.04, .49] .20 [–.05, .42]
4 All participants .64 [.50, .75] .63 [.48, .74] .32 [.12, .50] .27 [.06, .45]
DI, discrimination index. The correlation coefficients are shown for Experiments 1–4, separately for experimental
groups.
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variables in judgment and decision making.9 Moreover, the
stability of RH use is not affected by individual differences in
knowledge or recognition validities, suggesting that it truly
reflects a specific style of decision making rather than individ-
ual differences in the information on which decisions and in-
ferences are based.
Stability as an important precondition opens the way for ex-
ploring personality as a source of individual variation in
decision-making styles. However, our results also reveal one
limitation: We should not expect correlations between RH use
and personality traits larger than the stability coefficients ob-
served here. If the correlation between two tasks measuring
RH use in different domains does not exceed .33 (Exp. 3,
different group), then the correlation between a powerful person-
ality predictor and RH use should not be expected to exceed this
value, either. The insight that even powerful predictors can be
expected to show moderate correlations at best provides a pos-
sible explanation for the difficulties in finding replicable rela-
tions betweenRHuse and individual traits (Hilbig, 2008; Pachur
et al., 2009).
Furthermore, our work also opens the way for exploring
another rather neglected influence on decision-making styles:
the interaction of personality and situational factors. For
instance, Bröder (2003) showed that intelligence moderates
adaptive use of the TTB heuristic, depending on whether or
not TTB performs well in a given decision context. In our view,
an analogous effect of intelligence on adaptive RH use is worth
investigating. One could also think of other potential interaction
effects. Hilbig (2008), for instance, suggested that participants
high in neuroticism prefer RH use over knowledge use in order
to avoid a diagnostic test of their abilities. If this holds, increas-
ing the self-value relevance of the task might boost the effect of
neuroticism. Furthermore, certain personality traits possibly re-
veal their influence only under certain situational conditions. For
instance, even if impulsivity by itself is not a predictor of strat-
egy selection (Bröder, 2012), a context condition such as time
pressure might turn it into one. By contrast, strong situational
influences might also eliminate the effect of personality. For
instance, the lack of evidence for an association between strat-
egy use and the need for cognition (Bröder, 2012) might origi-
nate from situational influences overshadowing personality in-
fluences. Controlling for situational influences as strictly as pos-
sible might reveal that the need for cognition is indeed an im-
portant predictor. We thus suggest using strictly neutral decision
contexts (i.e., “weak situations”; cf. Mischel, 1973) if the goal is
to study pure influences of personality traits on strategy use.
Moreover, following Kantner and Lindsay’s (2012, 2014)
analysis of individual differences in response bias, we might
ask whether RH use can be conceived of as a cognitive trait,
meaning “an aspect of cognition that typifies an individual”
(Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, p. 1164). Given the present data,
we cannot answer this question now. However, we are sure that
it will inspire future research. It would be interesting to analyze,
for example, whether people who prefer RH use over knowl-
edge use also favor other fast-and-frugal heuristics, such as the
TTB heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). Given that the
recognition and TTB heuristics share the one-reason decision-
making principle, correlations between preferences for the two
heuristics seem very likely. Furthermore, one could also explore
whether RH use is related to other response tendencies and
biases as part of “a more general, intra-individually stable
decision-making heuristic” (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, p. 1175).
In any case, one important conclusion can be drawn from
the present study: The likelihood of RH use is not only influ-
enced by situational determinants that affect the costs and
benefits of RH use (Erdfelder, Küpper-Tetzel, & Mattern,
2011; Hilbig et al., 2010; McCloy, Beaman, Frosch, &
Goddard, 2010; Oppenheimer, 2003; Pachur & Biele, 2007;
Pohl, Erdfelder, Hilbig, Liebke, & Stahlberg, 2013; Schooler
& Hertwig, 2005). As we have shown in the present research,
it is also influenced by relatively stable individual tendencies
favoring either RH use or the integration of further knowl-
edge. Thus, our work contributes to a new line of research
on the cognitive and personality traits underlying RH use,
aiming at a comprehensive theory that integrates situational
and personality determinants of decision strategies.
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Appendix
9 To illustrate, a stable response bias was shown using different time
intervals (ρ ∈ [.67, .73]) and presentation formats (ρ ∈ [.33, .81]; Kantner
& Lindsay, 2012). Similarly, delay discounting was found to be stable
across time (ρ ∈ [.71, .91]), stimulus materials (ρ ∈ [.18, .90]), and
presentation formats (ρ ∈ [.44, .83]; Odum, 2011).
Table 2 Main results concerning RH use in Experiment 1, using the
original recognition judgments of each session
Day Group Week Group
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2
Mean .76 [.71, .80] .73 [.66, .79] .78 [.73, .83] .69 [.62, .75]
SD .39 [.27, .55] .48 [.34, .67] .39 [.27, .56] .43 [.30, .60]
Correlation .67 [.34, .88] .58 [.23, .84]
Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients (with 95 %
Bayesian credible intervals) are measured via the hierarchical r-model
and shown separately for experimental groups and the two tests of the
RH. Test 1 refers to the initial test of the RH, whereas Test 2 refers to the
second test of the RH, done one day or one week later.
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Table 3 Within-test correlation coefficients (and 95 % confidence intervals) for all measures of RH use previously employed in the relevant literature
Exp. Material Measure of RH Use
Adherence Rate c d' DI
1 Test 1 .80 [.69, .87] .79 [.67, .86] .07 [–.18, .31] .33 [.09, .53]
Test 2 .84 [.75, .90] .76 [.63, .84] .40 [.18, .59] .40 [.18, .59]
2 Test 1 .91 [.86, .94] .91 [.86, .94] .50 [.32, .64] .63 [.47, .74]
Test 2 .90 [.85, .93] .91 [.87, .94] .65 [.50, .76] .77 [.66, .84]
3 Celebrities .88 [.81, .92] .88 [.82, .93] .20 [–.04, .42] .21 [–.03, .43]
Movies .82 [.72, .88] .80 [.69, .87] .38 [.15, .57] .31 [.08, .51]
Islands .93 [.89, .96] .92 [.87, .95] .38 [.15, .57] .49 [.28, .66]
Musicians .86 [.78, .91] .87 [.79, .92] .47 [.25, .64] .58 [.39, .73]
4 Names .92 [.89, .95] .93 [.89, .95] .46 [.27, .61] .44 [.26, .60]
Pictures .91 [.87, .94] .91 [.86, .94] .55 [.38, .68] .55 [.38, .68]
DI, discrimination index. The correlation coefficients are shown for Experiments 1–4, separately for the two tests of the RH. For Experiments 1 and 2,
Test 1 refers to the initial test of the RH, whereas Test 2 refers to the second test of the RH, performed one day or one week later. Within-test correlations
are estimated using the Spearman–Brown-corrected Pearson correlation coefficient.
Table 4 Correlation coefficients
(with 95 % Bayesian credible
intervals) for the correlations
between RH use and recognition
validity and between RH use and
knowledge validity, separately for
the two tests of the RH
Exp. Group Correlation Between RH Use and
Recognition Validity Knowledge Validity
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2
1 Day group .35 [–.09, .71] .37 [–.05, .71] .13 [–.05, .55] .29 [–.14, .68]
Week group .41 [–.01, .73] .31 [–.12, .67] .25 [–.48, .80] .38 [–.13, .79]
2 Day group –.06 [–.40, .29] –.16 [–.48, .19] –.35 [–.62, –.02] –.36 [–.63, –.04]
Week group –.01 [–.10, .35] .06 [–.32, .42] –.03 [–.16, .31] .01 [–.33, .35]
3 Related group –.02 [–.28, .25] .16 [–.11, .42] .36 [.09, .60] .07 [–.22, .36]
Different group .23 [–.05, .48] .22 [–.03, .46] .19 [–.11, .48] .19 [–.12, .47]
4 All participants .01 [–.22, .25] –.19 [–.40, .40] .58 [.36, .76] .22 [–.01, .45]
The correlation coefficients are shown for Experiments 1–4, separately for experimental groups and the two tests
of the RH. Boldface indicates significant correlations, shown by credible intervals that do not include 0. For
Experiments 1 and 2, Test 1 refers to the initial test of the RH, whereas Test 2 refers to the second test of the RH,
performed one day or one week later. For Experiment 3, Tests 1 and 2 refer to the two different domains that were
used as materials (celebrities vs. movies and islands vs. musicians). For Experiment 4, Tests 1 and 2 refer to the
two presentation formats (names vs. pictures). Recognition and knowledge validities are assessed via the a and b
parameters of the r-model, respectively. Correlations are estimated using the hierarchical r-model.
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Table 5 Correlation coefficients (with 95 % Bayesian credible
intervals) for recognition and knowledge validities across tests
Exp. Group Test-Retest Correlations
Recognition Validity Knowledge Validity
1 Day group .81 [.57, .95] .67 [.29, .91]
Week group .88 [.71, .97] .48 [–.24, .88]
2 Day group –.10 [–.47, .27] .53 [.21, .78]
Week group .05 [–.08, .43] .51 [.41, .78]
3 Related group .38 [.11, .62] .06 [–.28, .38]
Different group .43 [.18, .65] .28 [–.10, .61]
4 All participants .16 [–.08, .38] .70 [.46, .85]
The correlation coefficients are shown for Experiments 1–4, separately
for experimental groups. Recognition and knowledge validities are
assessed via the a and b parameters of the r-model, respectively. Corre-
lations are estimated using the hierarchical r-model.
Table 6 Comparison between zero-order and partial correlation coefficients (with 95% Bayesian credible intervals) for RH use across tests, partialing
out the effects of the recognition validities of Tests 1 and 2 and the knowledge validities of Tests 1 and 2, respectively
Exp. Group Zero-Order Correlation Partial Correlation Controlling for
Recognition Validity Knowledge Validity
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2
1 Day group .80 [.55, .94] .78 [.52, .94] .78 [.54, .94] .81 [.57, .95] .79 [.55, .94]
Week group .71 [.39, .91] .66 [.33, .89] .66 [.32, .89] .66 [.24, .90] .66 [.30, .90]
2 Day group .54 [.26, .75] .55 [.28, .75] .54 [.26, .75] .48 [.19, .71] .46 [.16, .69]
Week group .53 [.25, .75] .53 [.24, .76] .55 [.28, .77] .53 [.25, .75] .54 [.25, .76]
3 Related group .42 [.17, .63] .42 [.18, .62] .40 [.15, .61] .36 [.10, .59] .42 [.17, .63]
Different group .33 [.08, .55] .33 [.08, .55] .34 [.09, .56] .28 [.003, .52] .29 [.03, .52]
4 All participants .60 [.43, .74] .60 [.44, .74] .59 [.43, .73] .48 [.26, .67] .57 [.39, .72]
The zero-order and partial correlation coefficients are shown for Experiments 1–4, separately for experimental groups. For Experiments 1 and 2, Test 1
refers to the initial test of the RH, whereas Test 2 refers to the second test of the RH, performed one day or one week later. For Experiment 3, Tests 1 and 2
refer to the two different domains that were used as materials (celebrities vs. movies and islands vs. musicians). For Experiment 4, Tests 1 and 2 refer to
the two presentation formats (names vs. pictures). Recognition and knowledge validities are assessed via the a and b parameters of the r-model,
respectively. Correlations and partial correlations are estimated using the hierarchical r-model.
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INTELLIGENCE AND RH-USE 
 
Abstract 
Within the adaptive toolbox approach, it has repeatedly been shown that, on average, 
people tend to adapt their decision strategies to the decision context. However, it 
remains unclear whether individuals systematically differ in their ability to successfully 
adapt to the situation. We addressed this question with respect to the fast-and-frugal 
recognition heuristic (RH). When deciding between recognized and unrecognized 
choice objects, individuals can base their decisions solely on recognition, as predicted 
by the RH, or they can integrate further knowledge retrieved from memory. Since 
intelligence has been conceived as the ability to successfully adapt to different 
situations, we expected intelligence to influence the degree of adaptive use of the RH. 
To test this hypothesis, we first reanalyzed a study that assessed individual RH-use in a 
decision domain for which RH-use is known to be very efficient. As expected, RH-use 
increased with general intelligence. Next, we designed an experiment addressing 
individual RH-use in two new decision domains, one domain for which RH-use was 
less efficient than knowledge integration and another domain for which both strategies 
were about equally efficient. Moreover, we tested whether fluid or crystallized 
intelligence best predicts adaptive use of the RH. RH-use was found to decrease with 
fluid but not crystallized intelligence when RH-use was less efficient than knowledge 
integration. In contrast, there was no association between either type of intelligence and 
RH-use when none of the two strategies was optimal. Hence, adaptive use versus non-
use of the RH appears to be moderated by fluid intelligence. 
 
 
Keywords: Adaptive decision making, recognition heuristic, intelligence, multinomial 
processing tree models, hierarchical Bayesian modeling 
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Do smarter people make better decisions? The influence of intelligence on adaptive use 
of the recognition heuristic 
 
Introduction 
Individuals display a great deal of adaptivity in decision making. As such, 
individuals select decision strategies in accordance with both their own current 
processing resources and the characteristics of the decision context (e.g., Gigerenzer & 
Selten, 2001; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993; Simon, 1956, 1990). Building 
upon this insight, Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) suggested the 
adaptive toolbox. The basic idea is that people possess a repertoire of decision 
strategies, termed heuristics, to solve the decision problems they face. Heuristics 
address the limited cognitive resources in a specific context by requiring only a 
minimum of knowledge and information processing. Moreover, heuristics are domain-
specific, that is, tailored to a specific type of decision problem, and ecologically 
rational to the degree they match the structure of the environment (Gigerenzer et al., 
1999).  
In recent years, several fast-and-frugal heuristics have been proposed as part of 
the adaptive toolbox. One of the most prominent examples is the recognition heuristic 
(RH; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002). According to the RH, decision makers 
should base their choice solely on recognition while ignoring any additional 
information. Alternatively, they can integrate knowledge retrieved from memory. For 
instance, when asked to decide which of two cities is more populous (with one city 
recognized and the other not) a decision maker can either simply chose the city he or 
she recognizes, or use knowledge retrieved from memory. To illustrate, the decision 
maker might know that the recognized city has an international airport and that cities 
with an international airport are most often more populous than cities without one.  
Previous research has shown that people generally tend to apply the RH 
adaptively. For example, decision makers adapt to the validity of the recognition cue, 
that is, to the correlation between recognition and the criterion of interest (e.g., the 
population of cities). On average, they rely more on the RH when recognition validity 
is high compared to when it is low (e.g., Castela, Kellen, Erdfelder, & Hilbig, 2014; 
Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010; Pachur, Mata, & Schooler, 2009; Pohl, 2006; 
4 
INTELLIGENCE AND RH-USE 
Scheibehenne & Bröder, 2007). In contrast, decision makers apply the RH less when 
valid knowledge is easily available and can be integrated without much effort (e.g., 
Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011; Hilbig, Michalkiewicz, Castela, 
Pohl, & Erdfelder, 2015; Hilbig, Pohl, & Bröder, 2009; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; 
Richter & Späth, 2006). Furthermore, decision makers use the RH in accordance with 
current constraints evoked by the context, such as time pressure (e.g., Hilbig, Erdfelder, 
& Pohl, 2012; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). 
Despite this massive evidence, one important question remained largely 
unanswered so far: Do people differ in their ability to adapt to a given decision context? 
And if so, which cognitive factors might explain these differences? In other words, does 
the decision context interact with individual characteristics? This question is of special 
importance as individuals’ decisions are not only largely affected by situational factors, 
but also by individual traits (e.g., Hilbig, 2008; Pohl, von Massow, & Beckmann, 2016) 
and cognitive resources (e.g., Pohl, Erdfelder, Hilbig, Liebke, & Stahlberg, 2013). As 
already emphasized by Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) and Pachur, Bröder, and 
Marewski (2008), only the inclusion of both situational and individual factors into the 
theory of decision making will result in a comprehensive theory and a profound 
understanding thereof. Recently, Michalkiewicz and Erdfelder (2016) opened the way 
for investigating the joint effect of the decision context and cognitive abilities on 
adaptive use of the RH by showing both temporal and cross-situational stability in RH-
use.  
Building upon these results, the current paper addresses the effect of what can 
be considered the most fundamental cognitive resource, namely, intelligence. Neisser et 
al. (1996, p. 77) characterized human intelligence as the “ability to understand complex 
ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in 
various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought”. Sternberg and 
Salter (1982, p. 3) simply defined intelligence as “goal-directed adaptive behavior”. 
Obviously, the common understanding of human intelligence focuses on adaptation as a 
core feature. In fact, there are several ways in which intelligence could influence 
strategy use, for example, by affecting (1) the available strategy repertoire, (2) strategy 
selection, or (3) strategy execution (Lemaire, 2010). The present paper focuses on fluid 
and crystallized intelligence, the two major second-factors of human intelligence 
(Cattell, 1963), and their influence on strategy selection.  
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Fluid intelligence has been conceived as the capacity to think logically and 
solve problems in novel situations, independent of acquired knowledge (Horn & 
Cattell, 1966, 1967). Among others, fluid intelligence includes such abilities as pattern 
recognition, abstract reasoning, and problem solving. Thus, fluid intelligence can be 
expected to facilitate identifying the statistical structure of the environment (hence, the 
validity of the recognition cue compared to the validity of knowledge) and to identify 
the appropriate decision strategy accordingly (Horn, 1991; Mata, Schooler, & 
Rieskamp, 2007). By implication, fluid intelligence should foster adaptive use versus 
non-use of the RH. In contrast, crystallized intelligence has been conceived as the 
ability to use skills, knowledge, and experience acquired as a product of educational 
and cultural experience (Horn & Cattell, 1966, 1967). Crystallized intelligence might 
also foster adaptive RH-use because crystallized intelligence is associated with better 
knowledge about the fit between environments and potential strategies (Mata et al., 
2007) and also with more extensive experience concerning strategy selection (Horn & 
Cattell, 1966). However, this benefit of crystallized intelligence is unlikely to emerge in 
any situation; it seems more plausible that it is limited to contexts where the 
environmental structure is well-known or can easily be derived from past experience. 
 Past research has revealed some support for the notion that fluid and 
crystallized intelligence affect adaptive use of decision strategies. For example, Bröder 
(2003) discovered that adaptive use of the take-the-best heuristic (TTB; Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1999) was moderated by intelligence. In one study, participants scoring 
higher on fluid intelligence were more often classified as users of the more adequate 
strategy as determined by the payoff structure of the environment. In a second study, an 
influence of crystallized intelligence was also apparent, although not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, Mata et al. (2007) investigated the effect of age differences on 
adaptive use of TTB. They observed that young adults outperformed older adults in 
adaptive use of the TTB heuristic and explained this difference by an age-related 
cognitive decline (i.e., a decrease in fluid intelligence). Similarly, Pachur et al. (2009) 
showed that both young and older adults adjusted RH-use between environments with 
high and low recognition validities. However, older adults failed to abandon the RH 
when necessary, that is, they tended to use the RH even in contexts for which this 
heuristic was inappropriate. Again, these age-related constraints were explained by 
fluid intelligence (for a reanalysis see Horn, Pachur, & Mata, 2015). 
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Based on these insights, we hypothesize that intelligence will lead to better 
adaptation to a given situation and thus to more use of the smarter, that is, more valid, 
decision strategy (RH vs. knowledge integration) in the respective decision context. To 
test this hypothesis, we first reanalyzed a study by Hilbig (2008). In particular, we 
assessed whether general intelligence will be associated with more RH-use when 
recognition validity1 is substantially larger than knowledge validity2. If true, this result 
will represent a first indication that intelligence moderates adaptive RH-use. However, 
this finding alone would not prove that intelligence affects adaptive use of the RH. A 
possible alternative explanation would be that RH-use perhaps generally increases with 
intelligence, irrespective of the decision context. Moreover, it is not clear which 
component or components of intelligence affect adaptive RH-use. To test between these 
two alternative explanations and to identify which component of general intelligence is 
responsible for successful adaptation to the situation, we additionally assessed the 
effect of fluid and crystallized intelligence on adaptive RH-use in two novel decision 
scenarios. First, we analyzed whether fluid and crystallized intelligence will be 
associated with less RH-use when recognition validity is substantially smaller than 
knowledge validity (knowledge condition) – opposite to the scenario studied by Hilbig 
(2008). Second, we analyzed whether both fluid and crystallized intelligence will have 
little effect on strategy selection when recognition and knowledge validities do not 
differ (neutral condition). Studying these scenarios will provide evidence for or against 
an effect of intelligence on adaptive RH-use. Furthermore, it will offer insights whether 
fluid or crystallized intelligence is more important for adaptive strategy selection. 
 
 
Methodological preliminaries 
Task 
The standard paradigm to investigate the RH consists of a recognition task and a 
paired-comparison task (e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Hilbig & Pohl, 2009; 
Pachur et al., 2009). In the recognition task, participants are asked to provide yes-no 
                                                 
1
 Recognition validity is defined as the proportion of recognition pairs (i.e., one object 
recognized, the other not recognized) where choice of the recognized object represents the correct choice 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 78). 
2
 Knowledge validity is defined as the proportion of correct choices based on all pairs where 
both objects are recognized (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 78). 
7 
INTELLIGENCE AND RH-USE 
recognition judgments for a set of objects drawn from a decision domain like the 
worlds’ most populous cities. For the paired-comparison task, this set of objects is 
exhaustively paired. For each pair of object, participants have to decide which of the 
two objects has the higher value with respect to the criterion of interest (e.g., which city 
is more populous).  
 
Model 
We analyzed the data with the most widely used method for assessing RH-use, 
the r-model (see Figure 1; Hilbig et al., 2010), a multinomial processing tree (MPT) 
model (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009), whose name-giving r 
parameter can be directly interpreted as the proportion of pure RH-use. The 
complimentary probability 1 - r, by implication, can be interpreted as the proportion of 
integrating further knowledge. Compared to other measures of the RH this model offers 
the advantage that RH-use is assessed free of confounds with knowledge integration. 
For a comprehensive overview of the advantages of the r-model, see Hilbig (2010). 
Specifically, we extended a hierarchical implementation of the r-model 
(Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016), based on the latent-trait approach to MPT models 
(Klauer, 2010), by including intelligence as a predictor of RH-use into the model. This 
hierarchical model has two main advantages: First, it assumes that individual 
parameters stem from group-level distributions, estimated along with individual-level 
parameters. Using this hierarchical framework, individual parameters are estimated 
more reliably compared to non-hierarchical analyses by making use of the underlying 
group-level structure (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2004). Second, the influence of 
intelligence on RH-use is assessed by directly incorporating intelligence measures into 
the estimation of RH-use in terms of a regression.3 The estimated regression 
coefficients are thus adjusted for the uncertainty of the individual estimates of RH-use. 
For an introduction to hierarchical MPT models see Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder, and 
Wagenmakers (2015). An implementation of the latent-trait approach in other MPT 
models can be found in Arnold, Bayen, and Smith (2015). 
                                                 
3
 In contrast, conventional analyses consist of two-step procedures of estimating model 
parameters separately for each participant first, followed by regression analyses of RH-use on personality 
measures’ scores (cf. Arnold, Bayen, & Böhm, 2014; Hilbig, 2008). 
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Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchical latent-trait r-model including general 
intelligence as a predictor of RH-use. In particular, individual RH-use ri (i = 1, …, I ) is 
modeled in a probit transformed parameter space as a linear combination of the group 
mean μr, a multiplicative scale parameter ξr, and individual deviations from the group 
mean δir. To test our hypotheses, we additionally incorporate general intelligence test 
scores, Inti, with a regression coefficient βInt into the estimation of individual RH-use: 
-1(ri) = μr + ξr ∙ δir + βInt ∙ Inti. Generalizing the model to include two intelligence 
measures, Fluidi and Crysti, together with their regression coefficients β̂Fluid and β̂Cryst, 
is straightforward.  
To ensure that the regression coefficients are comparable, we standardized all 
intelligence test scores. We performed all analyses within the Bayesian framework 
using OpenBUGS (Lunn, Spiegelhalter, Thomas, & Best, 2009) through R2WinBUGS 
(Sturtz, Ligges, & Gelman, 2005). Specifically, we ran three chains with 500,000 
iterations each using a thinning rate of 10 and discarded the first 100,000 iterations as 
burn-in period. We verified satisfactory convergence of the three chains (�̂ < 1.01; 
Gelman et al., 2004) and sufficiently large effective sample sizes (Kruschke, 2014). 
Core results are the means of the posterior distributions along with their 95% Bayesian 
credible intervals (BCI) for group-level recognition validity μ̂a, knowledge validity μ̂b, 
RH-use μ̂r, and the variation in RH-use across subjects σ̂r. Thereby, the BCIs represent 
the precision of these parameter estimates. Most importantly, we are interested in the 
effect of intelligence on RH-use, in particular, of general intelligence β̂Int in the 
reanalysis of Hilbig’s (2008) data, and of fluid and crystallized intelligence, β̂Fluid and β̂Cryst, in the new experiment reported here. In this case, the BCIs indicate whether the 
effect can be considered meaningful, that is, significantly different from zero.  
 
Reanalysis of Hilbig’s (2008) data 
The original purpose of Hilbig’s (2008) study was to investigate the effect of 
neuroticism on RH-use, while assessing general intelligence as a potential confounding 
variable. Participants first completed a battery of personality tests, including the 
Berliner Intelligenz-Struktur-Test (BIS; Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 1997) as a measure 
of general intelligence, and then worked on the standard paradigm of RH-use described 
above. To test for an influence of general intelligence on RH-use, we applied the 
hierarchical latent-trait r-model described above to the data of Hilbig (2008). Our 
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reanalysis shows that the decision domain used by Hilbig (i.e., city-size comparisons 
for the world’s most populous cities) favors RH-use over knowledge-use: The mean 
recognition validity is clearly higher than the mean knowledge validity 
(μ̂a = .74 [.70; .77], μ̂b = .55 [.51; .59]; Δ̂a-b = .19 [.13; .25]). In line with this finding, 
decision makers preferred RH-use over knowledge integration (μ̂r = .73 [.64; .81]) on 
average. Also, the average proportion of RH-use was comparable in size to previous 
studies using the same material (e.g., Hilbig et al., 2010). Most importantly, there was a 
positive effect of general intelligence on RH-use (β̂Int = 0.31 [0.05, 0.59]). Thus, 
participants higher in intelligence prefer the smarter, that is, more valid decision 
strategy when using the RH in the city-size comparison context.  
 
Experiment 
Methods 
Design and Materials. We assessed use of the RH using the standard paradigm 
described before. Specifically, to facilitate finding an influence of crystallized 
intelligence we used easily accessible and common materials: The 100 most successful 
celebrities according to the Forbes List 2012 (www.forbes.com), which defines success 
as entertainment-related earnings plus media visibility. To test our core hypothesis, we 
manipulated the difference between recognition and knowledge validities in the paired-
comparison task between participants in two conditions.4 In particular, we asked for 
celebrities’ age in the knowledge condition and for celebrities’ success in the neutral 
condition. The results of an independent prestudy had previously shown that, in the 
knowledge condition, the mean recognition validity is significantly smaller than the 
mean knowledge validity (Ƚ̅ = .56, SD = .07, β̅ = .77, SD = .12; t(29) = 7.99, p < .001, 
BF10 > 1000)5, whereas both validities are very similar in the neutral condition (Ƚ̅ = .64, 
SD = .08, β̅ = .61, SD = .12; t(29) = 1.18, p = .25, BF10 = 0.36).  
We used standard measures to assess fluid and crystallized intelligence (Horn, 
1991): A short form of the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM: Raven, Court, & 
                                                 
4
 We refrained from using a within-participant manipulation because use of the same stimulus 
materials with different questions can lead to severe carry-over effects concerning strategy use. 
5
 Bayes factors for the t-tests were computed by means of the BayesFactor R package (Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) and interpreted according to the classification by Jeffreys 
(1961).  
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Raven, 1983; short form: Bors & Stokes, 1998) and verbal subtests from the BIS, 
respectively.  
Participants and Procedure. A total of 93 participants were recruited via 
posters at the University of Mannheim. The sample consisted of 71 women and 22 men, 
aged between 18 and 52 years (M = 22.5 years, SD = 5.2). All participants were 
students (except for three) and were fluent in German. 
After providing consent and demographic information, participants completed 
the two intelligence tests, first the APM and then the BIS subtests, or vice versa. Then, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions described above and 
worked on the standard RH paradigm relating either to celebrities’ age (knowledge 
condition) or to celebrities’ success (neutral condition). Thereby, the sequence of the 
recognition and the paired-comparison task was randomized across participants. 
Finally, participants received course credit or a flat fee of 6 Euro, were thanked, and 
debriefed. 
 
Results 
One participant recognized all celebrities and therefore had to be excluded from 
the following analyses. For the remaining 92 participants, descriptive analyses revealed 
that fluid intelligence, as captured by the APM, showed strong heterogeneity between 
participants (M = 7.1, SD = 3.3, Min = 0, Max = 12, and M = 7.6, SD = 2.4, Min = 2, 
Max = 12, for the knowledge and the neutral condition, respectively, on a scale from 0 
to 12). Similarly, crystallized intelligence, as assessed by the verbal BIS tests, varied 
considerably across participants (M = 44.0, SD = 5.2, Min = 28, Max = 53, and 
M = 42.1, SD = 6.1 Min = 25, Max = 52, for the knowledge and the neutral condition, 
respectively, on a scale from 0 to 61). In sum, the results were comparable to previous 
studies using the same measures (e.g., Bors & Stokes, 1998; Bucik & Neubauer, 1996). 
Furthermore, as expected, both intelligence measures were correlated within conditions 
(ρ(48) = .50, p < .001, BF10 = 75.04, and ρ(44) = .33, p = .03, BF10 = 1.21, for the 
knowledge and the neutral condition, respectively)6, replicating previous findings with 
respect to Gf and Gc (e.g., Cattell, 1963; Cunningham, Clayton, & Overton, 1975). 
                                                 
6
 Bayes factors for the Pearson correlations were computed using code provided by Wetzels and 
Wagenmakers (2012) and interpreted following the classification by Jeffreys (1961). 
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To analyze our data, we used the hierarchical latent-trait r-model with fluid and 
crystallized intelligence as predictors of RH-use. This analysis demonstrates that the 
materials had been chosen in line with our goals: Participants in the knowledge 
condition showed decisively lower recognition than knowledge validities 
(μ̂a = .52 [.49; .55], μ̂b = .77 [.74; .79]; Δ̂a-b = -.24 [-.28; -.21]). Thus, this decision 
environment favored knowledge-use over RH-use. In contrast, recognition and 
knowledge validities matched almost perfectly in the neutral condition 
(μ̂a = .67 [.64; .69], μ̂b = .66 [.63; .69]; Δ̂a-b = .01 [-.03; .05]), showing that both 
strategies were equally efficient here. Replicating the results on RH-use reported above, 
we found that people adjusted RH-use in line with the relative validity of the 
recognition cue. Participants in the neutral condition (μ̂r
 
= .87 [.84, .91], σ̂r = 0.50 [0.37, 0.66]) used the RH more often than participants in the knowledge 
condition (μ̂r = .06 [.02, .11], σ̂r = 1.27 [0.90, 1.80]; Δ̂r = -.81 [-.87, -.73]). Also, there 
was large variation in RH-use across individuals, as repeatedly found throughout the 
literature (e.g., Hilbig & Richter, 2011; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Pachur et al., 2008).  
In line with our first hypothesis, both intelligence measures exerted negative 
effects on RH-use in the knowledge condition (β̂Fluid = -0.83 [-1.34, -0.37] and β̂Cryst = -0.19 [-0.64, 0.24]), indicating that higher levels of intelligence are associated 
with use of further knowledge. However, as indicated by the BCIs, only the effect of 
fluid intelligence was significantly different from zero. Thus, whereas fluid intelligence 
affects RH-use even if individual differences in crystallized intelligence are statistically 
controlled for, the reverse does not hold. Moreover, in line with our second hypothesis, 
in the neutral condition we observed that the association between intelligence measures 
and RH-use was not meaningful, neither for fluid nor for crystallized intelligence 
(β̂Fluid = -0.16 [-0.34, 0.02] and β̂Cryst = -0.03 [-0.20, 0.14]). Thus, we conclude that 
fluid intelligence did not generally influence use versus non-use of the RH; an effect 
was apparent only under conditions that clearly favor one strategy over the other.  
To control for possible confounds between intelligence measures and 
knowledge about celebrities, we replicated the analyses after additionally including 
individual recognition and knowledge validities as (standardized) predictors. Inclusion 
of these control variables affected the regression coefficients for the core predictors of 
interest only marginally (see Table 1). The effects of individual recognition and 
knowledge validities showed the expected pattern descriptively: Recognition validity 
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affected RH-use positively whereas knowledge validity affected it negatively. 
However, only the effect of knowledge validity in the knowledge condition was 
reliable. Also, controlling for task order of the recognition and the paired-comparison 
task did not change the pattern of results. To sum up, we found support for the 
hypothesis that intelligence moderates adaptive use of the RH and that fluid intelligence 
is primarily responsible for this effect.  
 
Discussion 
Do smarter people make better decisions? To address this question, we 
investigated the influence of intelligence on individual differences in adaptive use of 
the recognition heuristic (RH; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The RH is one of the 
simplest and yet surprisingly successful heuristics within the adaptive toolbox 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). It predicts choice of the recognized object without 
consideration of additional information. The importance of adaptivity in decision 
making has been stressed repeatedly (e.g., Simon, 1990). There are numerous studies 
showing that typical decision makers adapt RH-use according to availability of 
cognitive resources (e.g., Pohl et al., 2013) and environmental structures (e.g., Hilbig et 
al., 2010). However, so far, only a single study addressed individual differences in 
adaptivity by showing that adaptive RH-use declines in older adults (Pachur et al., 
2009). As suggested by Mata et al. (2007) and supported by Bröder (2003), this age-
related deficit might be caused by a decline in cognitive capacities, especially in fluid 
and crystallized intelligence. Thus, fluid and crystallized intelligence might be the 
genuine source of adaptive RH-use, in line with the idea that intelligence reflects the 
general capacity for successful adaptation (e.g., Neisser et al., 1996). 
Our purpose was to test whether intelligence in general, and fluid and 
crystallized intelligence in particular, affect adaptive RH-use. Therefore, we first 
reanalyzed a study by Hilbig (2008). In this study, the decision context favored RH-use 
over knowledge integration, while intelligence was assessed in terms of general 
intelligence. In a decision context that requires RH-use, we expected RH-use to 
increase with general intelligence. In addition, we conducted a new experiment with 
two different decision contexts. The context either disfavored RH-use and thereby 
fostered use of further knowledge (opposite to the scenario used by Hilbig) or did not 
favor any of the two strategies. To test which component of general intelligence drives 
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the effect, intelligence was assessed in terms of fluid and crystallized intelligence, the 
two major second-order factors of human intelligence (Cattell, 1963). In a decision 
context that requires knowledge-use, we expected RH-use to decline with intelligence 
in general and fluid and crystallized intelligence in particular. In contrast, in a context 
where both strategies are equally advantageous, we expected no influence of either type 
of intelligence on RH-use.  
To analyze our data, we adapted the hierarchical latent-trait r-model (Hilbig et 
al., 2010; Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016) based on Klauer’s latent-trait approach 
(2010) to include either general intelligence (for the reanalysis of Hilbig’s (2008) data) 
or fluid and crystallized intelligence (for the analysis of the new experiment) as 
predictors of RH-use. Thereby we closed a methodological gap in research on 
individual differences in RH-use. This model allows assessment of the influence of 
intelligence measures on RH-use in a straightforward way by estimating each 
individual’s probability of RH-use as a linear combination of intelligence measures. 
Moreover, it features another important advantage: Standard analyses are problematic 
because they are based on model parameters estimated separately for each participant. 
This can lead to unreliable and probably biased parameter estimates and to correlation 
or regression coefficients that are severely underestimated (e.g., Klauer, 2010). In 
contrast, by applying the hierarchical latent-trait r-model, individual parameters are 
estimated more reliably by borrowing strength from the imposed group-level structure. 
Hence, the present study is not only an important step in uncovering sources of 
individual differences in adaptive RH-use but also in improving methods for analyzing 
these individual differences. 
The results corroborated our hypotheses. First, our reanalysis of Hilbig’s (2008) 
data showed that general intelligence is positively associated with RH-use in a domain 
where RH-use is optimal. Second, in the experiment reported herein, fluid and 
crystallized intelligence were negatively related to RH-use in a domain where 
knowledge-use is optimal. Whereas the effect of fluid intelligence was reliable when 
individual differences in crystallized intelligence were statistically controlled for, the 
reverse did not hold. Thus, crystallized intelligence cannot explain individual 
differences in RH-use over and above to what can be explained by fluid intelligence 
alone. In line with corresponding findings of Bröder (2003) and Mata et al. (2007), this 
suggests that fluid intelligence as measured by the APM is the more fundamental and 
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powerful predictor of adaptive use of simple decision heuristics. Third, there was no 
substantial relation between RH-use and either type of intelligence when the decision 
context did not determine the optimal strategy. Although none of the strategies was 
superior a priori, it is not surprising that we observed high levels of RH-use here on 
average. It is plausible that the RH is typically preferred under neutral conditions, 
simply because it represents the less effortful and less time consuming strategy – the 
default (Pachur et al., 2009) – compared to knowledge-use. Put differently, because 
both strategies were equally valid, RH-use might have been preferred on average 
because the more demanding strategy of knowledge integration was considered not 
worth the effort (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008). 
Note that we observed a weak negative association between intelligence and 
RH-use even when both strategies (RH-use and knowledge-use) were equally adequate. 
In other words, in a situation where the context does not uniquely determine the optimal 
strategy, higher levels of intelligence tend to be associated with a preference for the 
more complex and cognitively demanding strategy (i.e., knowledge integration). A 
possible explanation is that intelligent people enjoy cognitively demanding decision 
strategies. In particular, need for cognition (NFC) reflects the inclination towards 
effortful cognitive activities (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) and has been 
shown to be associated with intelligence (e.g., Fleischhauer et al., 2010). Therefore, it 
seems plausible that intelligent people prefer complex information integration over 
simple decision strategies simply because of their higher levels of NFC. Certainly, this 
idea awaits further investigation.  
Despite the converging evidence, our study has some caveats. First, we used a 
student sample with higher-than-average levels of intelligence. Whereas the APM test 
was tailored to this type of sample, the BIS tests were designed for the general 
population. This perhaps explains the restricted range of BIS scores in our sample and 
might have contributed to the small effect of crystallized intelligence. Second, it is 
possible that the verbal subtests of the BIS do not capture those aspects of crystallized 
intelligence that are most closely linked to adaptive strategy selection (cf. Beauducel, 
Liepmann, Felfe, & Nettelnstroth, 2007). In fact, Bröder (2003) found equivocal results 
when using the same subtests of the BIS. He found a slightly positive effect of verbal 
intelligence on use of the TTB heuristic in his main study but not in the corresponding 
pre-study. Also, Mata et al. (2007) did not find associations between measures of verbal 
15 
INTELLIGENCE AND RH-USE 
knowledge and the TTB heuristic. Analogously, one might object that the APM capture 
selected aspects of fluid intelligence only, possibly leading to an underestimation of the 
true effect size that could be observed in principle. Third, one might argue that our 
inference tasks were overly artificial and thus did not invite use of cumulated 
knowledge acquired in educational contexts or by means of everyday experience. As a 
consequence, the weak effect of crystallized intelligence does not come as a surprise. 
Future research should make use of participant samples, inference tasks, and 
intelligence measures that more closely fit real-world scenarios. Future research should 
also focus on mechanisms underlying the effect of intelligence on strategy selection. 
Although we proposed possible mechanisms that might explain the effects of fluid and 
crystallized intelligence on strategy selection, we did not test the underlying 
mechanisms directly.  
To sum up, our results strongly suggest that intelligence does not affect RH-use 
in general but rather moderates adaptivity in use of the RH. They thus nicely fit into 
related lines of research that emphasize the importance of accounting for individual 
differences in strategy selection (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2004; Pachur et al., 2008) as 
well as for potential interaction effects of individual traits and situational influences 
(e.g., Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016). In conclusion, this work broadens our 
understanding of adaptivity as one of the most important factors in decision making by 
demonstrating individual differences in adaptive strategy selection and revealing one of 
the cognitive factors underlying these differences.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1  
Influence of fluid and crystallized intelligence (while controlling for recognition and 
knowledge validity) on use of the recognition heuristic assessed via the hierarchical 
latent-trait r-model. 
 
Regression coefficients (with 95% BCIs) 
Variables  Knowledge condition Neutral condition 
Fluid intelligence (APM) -0.70 [-1.21, -0.24] -0.16 [-0.35, 0.03] 
Crystallized intelligence (BIS) -0.26 [-0.70, 0.17] -0.03 [-0.20, 0.15] 
Recognition validity 0.003 [-0.92, 0.92] 0.12 [-0.27, 0.51] 
Knowledge validity -0.62 [-1.23, -0.05] -0.02 [-0.36, 0.30] 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the r-model (adapted from Hilbig et al., 2010). The graph displays the 
cognitive processes leading to the eight possible choice options Cij (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) 
for the three object pairs (i.e., both, neither, and one object recognized) that can occur in a 
paired comparison task. Observable events are shown as rectangles, latent states as 
rectangles with rounded corners. Parameter r represents the proportion of RH-use. Parameters 
a, b, and g represent recognition validity, knowledge validity, and the proportion of correct 
guessing, respectively.  
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Figure 2. Illustration of the hierarchical r-model including intelligence as a predictor of RH-use 
(adapted from Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016). Shaded and unshaded nodes represent 
observable and unobservable variables, respectively; square and circular nodes represent 
discrete and continuous variables; single- and double-bordered nodes represent to be 
estimated and derived variables. The plates display the I individuals and the J object pairs (i.e., 
none, one, and both objects recognized). For each individual i and each object case j the 
category probabilities P(Cij) are modeled according to the r-model with category counts Cij ~ 
Multinomial(P(Cij),Nij) and number of observations Nij. Individual model parameters si (s ∈ { a, b, 
g, r }) are modeled in a probit-transformed parameter space as a linear combination of the 
group mean μs ~ N(0,1), a multiplicative scale parameter ξs ~ U(0,100), and individual 
displacement parameters δis ~ MvN(0,Σ), with Σ-1 ~ Wishard(I,5). In addition, individual RH-use 
ri is modeled as a linear combination of individual scores of intelligence Inti and a regression 
coefficient βInt ~ N(0,1). 
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IMPACT OF NFC AND FII ON RH 
 
Abstract 
The recognition heuristic (RH) is a decision strategy for paired-comparisons. It 
predicts choice based on recognition alone without consideration of additional 
information. Prior work has identified noteworthy individual differences in RH-use, 
suggesting that individuals have person-specific strategy preferences. To explain these 
differences, we assessed two plausible personality determinants: Need for cognition 
(NFC; i.e., enjoyment of cognitively demanding tasks) and faith in intuition (FII; i.e., 
trust in feelings and impressions). We hypothesized that NFC counteracts RH-use 
whereas FII fosters it. In our experiment, 82 undergraduates first provided personality 
measures and then worked on a decision task assessing RH-use in two conditions: A 
decision context that favored RH-use and thus represented the standard set-up for 
investigating RH-use, and a neutral context that was expected to boost effects of 
personality on decision strategies. To test for an effect of NFC and FII on RH-use in 
either condition, we applied a Bayesian hierarchical multinomial processing tree model 
that incorporates personality test scores directly into the estimation of RH-use. We 
found a negative effect of NFC and a positive, yet insignificant, effect of FII in both 
conditions. Hence, RH-use at least partly reflects a person-specific decision making 
style as determined by NFC. 
 
 
Keywords: fast-and-frugal heuristics; individual differences; need for cognition; faith 
in intuition; hierarchical Bayesian modeling 
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Explaining individual differences in fast-and-frugal decision making:  
The impact of need for cognition and faith in intuition  
on use of the recognition heuristic 
 
Introduction 
People do not only differ to a great extent in the decisions they make but also in 
the strategies they use to arrive at these decisions. For instance, when asking several 
persons to pick the more populous of two cities, some people simply choose the city 
they recognize (in case they recognize exactly one) whereas others deliberately try to 
retrieve all their relevant knowledge and integrate it to make a choice. The former 
strategy is one of the most extensively studied examples of the fast-and-frugal 
heuristics approach: The recognition heuristic (RH1; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), 
according to which choice is solely based on recognition. The latter strategy represents 
a compensatory information-integration approach, that is, integration of knowledge in 
addition to recognition.  
Previous research has revealed substantial individual differences in use of the 
RH over and above situational influences (e.g., Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; 
Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 2010; Newell & Shanks, 
2004; Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008). Figure 1 shows a typical example. It 
illustrates the individual proportions of RH-use in a study by Michalkiewicz and 
Erdfelder (2016, Exp. 2 Session 1), estimated with the Bayesian hierarchical latent-trait 
r-model that will be described in detail below. Obviously, even though the decision 
context is kept constant across participants for these data, RH-use varies significantly. 
The large variability not only found in this experiment but consistently found in other 
studies as well gives rise to the idea that people might have person-specific preferences 
for, or resentments to, certain decision strategies that perhaps can be linked to 
underlying personality factors. In fact, Michalkiewicz and Erdfelder (2016) showed that 
RH-use does not vary randomly within and between individuals. Rather, individual RH-
use is relatively stable across time and different situational contexts. Thus, it seems 
likely that individual RH-use reflects a person-specific style of decision making. This 
opens the way for research on personality determinants of RH-use. 
                                                 
1Abbreviations: RH = recognition heuristic; NFC = need for cognition; FII = faith in intuition 
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So far, it has turned out to be difficult to find personality traits that influence 
strategy selection in fast-and-frugal decision-making (e.g., Bröder, 2012). Specifically, 
there are only few studies on individual differences in RH-use. On a group level, 
Pachur, Mata, and Schooler (2009) (for a reanalysis, see Horn, Pachur & Mata, 2015), 
and Pohl, von Massow, and Beckmann (2016) detected significant age differences in 
use of the RH. According to their results, RH-use is more frequent in both adolescents 
and older adults compared to younger adults. Pachur et al. (2009) also tested for 
associations between measures of inhibitory control and individual RH-use but failed to 
find significant correlations. On the individual level, Hilbig (2008) investigated the Big 
Five personality traits and found a positive effect of neuroticism on individual RH-use 
but no significant effects of agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and 
extraversion. Furthermore, Michalkiewicz, Arden, and Erdfelder (2016) observed that 
fluid intelligence fostered adaptive use of the RH. Next to these studies, to the best of 
our knowledge, there is a lack of systematic investigations on personality determinants 
of RH-use waiting to be filled.  
One of the personality theories that allow clear-cut predictions on decision 
makers’ preferences for fast-and-frugal strategies, like the RH, versus cognitively 
demanding strategies, like knowledge integration, is the Cognitive-Experiential Self-
Theory (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). According to this theory, 
individuals can draw on two independent systems of information processing: the 
rational and the experiential system. The rational system is assumed to be analytic, 
slow, and demanding. It operates through reason, logic, and abstract thought. The 
experiential system, in contrast, is assumed to be fast, effortless, and associated with 
affect. Inferences are based, for instance, on concrete examples, categorical thinking, 
and personal experience. Everybody can make use of both modes of processing, but 
typically shows preferences for one of them.  
These preferences can be measured by two independent personality variables 
(Epstein et al, 1996): Need for cognition (NFC) and faith in intuition (FII). NFC is 
characterized as the extent to which people engage in and enjoy cognitively demanding 
tasks (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). High NFC is associated with increased elaboration, 
idea evaluation, and problem solving (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). FII, in contrast, is 
characterized as the extent to which people trust in intuitive feelings and immediate 
impressions (Epstein et al, 1996). High FII is associated with affective and associative 
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information processing that does not rely on verbal reasoning (Zimmerman, Redker, & 
Gibson, 2011). 
Past research has already established some links between NFC and FII on the 
one hand and heuristics of judgment and decision making on the other hand. For 
instance, NFC has been found to be associated with less use of the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic and partly immunized against both framing and sunk-cost effects 
in some studies (Carnevale, Inbar, & Lerner, 2011; Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Notably, 
however, Bröder (2012) failed to find an effect of NFC on use of the Take-the-Best 
heuristic. By contrast, FII was associated with enhanced use of the ease-of-retrieval 
heuristic, the representativeness heuristic, the reinforcement heuristic, and liability to 
framing effects (Alós-Ferrer & Hügelschäfer, 2012; Danziger, Moran, & Rafaely, 2006; 
Mahoney, Buboltz, Levin, Doverspike, & Svyantek, 2011). Epstein and colleagues 
(1996, p. 391) even claimed that “heuristic processing represents the natural mode of 
the experiential system.”  
In line with these results, Michalkiewicz et al. (2016) recently observed a 
negative correlation between fluid intelligence and RH-use in a neutral decision 
context, that is, a context in which simple RH-use and more elaborated knowledge-use 
were equally effective in terms of accuracy rates. In other words, higher levels of 
intelligence were weakly associated with a preference for the more complex and 
cognitively demanding strategy of knowledge integration, despite the fact that the much 
simpler and less effortful RH resulted in the same proportion of correct decisions. A 
plausible explanation is that, other things being equal, intelligent people tend to prefer 
knowledge-use over RH-use because of their higher level of NFC. In fact, a positive 
correlation between intelligence and NFC was repeatedly reported in the literature (e.g., 
Fleischhauer et al., 2010; Furnham & Thorne, 2013; Hill et al., 2013; von Stumm, 
2013).  
Based on the findings outlined above, we hypothesized that (1) NFC affects 
RH-use negatively. Stated differently, because participants high in NFC enjoy 
cognitively demanding activities, they will engage in reasoning, and will thus integrate 
their knowledge more often than participants low in NFC. By contrast, we hypothesized 
that (2) FII affects RH-use positively. Stated differently, because participants high in 
FII generally rely more on experiential information, such as recognition, they will use 
6 
IMPACT OF NFC AND FII ON RH 
the RH more often than participants low in FII. In addition, we assessed the Big Five 
personality traits to control for possible confounds (e.g., Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  
To assess whether the hypothesized effects of NFC and FII are moderated by 
decision strategy effectiveness in a specific decision context, we manipulated 
recognition and knowledge validities. As outlined by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002, 
p. 78), the recognition validity a is defined as the probability of making a correct choice 
when always following the recognition cue (and thus, using the RH), given that one 
object is recognized and the other is not. Correspondingly, the knowledge validity b is 
defined as the probability of making a correct choice given that both objects are 
recognized (and, thus, retrieved knowledge can be used). Hence, the RH is particularly 
efficient when a is high and b is low. In contrast, there is no clear advantage of using 
the RH versus using further knowledge when a and b are approximately equal.  
We created two decision contexts. In the facilitation condition, we studied the 
standard set-up of most RH studies in which use of the RH is more efficient in terms of 
maximizing correct decisions than use of knowledge (i.e., a > b). In contrast, in the 
neutral condition, none of the strategies is favored by the decision context (i.e., a ≈ b). 
Based on the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, we predicted a negative effect of 
NFC and a positive effect of FII on RH-use in either condition. However, based on 
Mischel’s (1973) dichotomy of strong versus weak situations, we expected these effects 
to be less easily detectable in the facilitation condition compared to the neutral 
condition. With respect to choice behavior, the facilitation condition conforms to what 
Mischel called a strong situation: It largely determines strategy choice in favor of RH 
use and thereby presumably masks effects of individual differences in NFC and FII. In 
contrast, the neutral condition conforms to what Mischel (1973) called a weak situation: 
It imposes much less constraints on strategy selection. Hence, we expected effects of 
NFC and FII to be more easily detectable in the neutral condition, because situational 
influences on strategy choice are minimized (cf. Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016).  
 
Methods 
Design & Materials 
To assess use of the RH, we relied on the most common paradigm, consisting of 
a recognition task and a paired-comparison task, presented in random order across 
participants. In the recognition task, participants provided yes-no recognition judgments 
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for a set of 25 objects. In the comparison task, participants were asked to decide for a 
set of 300 pairs (resulting from pairing the 25 objects exhaustively) which of two 
objects had a higher value with respect to the criterion of interest. 
We tested our hypotheses in two conditions manipulated within participants. In 
the facilitation condition, we used the world’s most successful musicians, defined by 
the number of records sold worldwide. Participants provided recognition judgments for 
a set of 25 musicians randomly drawn from the world’s 150 most successful musicians 
and compared them with respect to their success (i.e., records sold worldwide). In this 
condition, RH-use is more efficient than knowledge-use on a-priori grounds since the 
recognition validity is significantly higher than knowledge validity (a = .69, SD = .14, 
and b = .60, SD = .08; t(63) = 4.17, p < .001, BF10 = 224.77; cf. Michalkiewicz & 
Erdfelder, 2016)2.  
In the neutral condition, by contrast, we used the world’s longest rivers. 
Participants provided recognition judgments for a set of rivers randomly drawn from 
the world’s 60 longest rivers and compared them with respect to their lengths. In this 
condition, both RH-use and knowledge-use are equally efficient on a-priori grounds: 
According to an independent prestudy, recognition and knowledge validities are 
approximately equal for this decision domain (a = .65, SD = .10, and b = .62, SD = .21; 
t(21) = 0.53, p = .60, BF10 = 0.25).  
 
Participants & Procedure 
A total of 82 participants (38 females), aged between 16 and 39 years (M = 
22.6, SD = 3.2) were recruited at the University of Mannheim. All participants were 
students (except for six) and spoke German fluently (except for one).  
After providing consent and demographic information, participants first 
completed two personality questionnaires: The Rational-Experiential Inventory to 
access NFC and FII (Keller, Bohner, & Erb, 2000) and the NEO FFI to control for an 
influence of the Big Five personality traits (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989). Then, 
participants worked on the decision task measuring RH-use in the two conditions 
described above, arranged in a random order per participant. Finally, participants 
received a flat fee of 3 Euro, were thanked and debriefed. 
                                                 
2
 We computed Bayes factors BF10 for the t-tests using the BayesFactor R package (Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) and interpreted them according to Jeffreys (1961). 
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Model 
To analyze our data, we relied on the r-model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010), 
a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model. The r-model (see Figure 2) illustrates the 
cognitive processing paths that can occur for the three possible cases in a paired-
comparison task: Both, one, or none of the two objects is recognized. Responses 
provided in the paired-comparison task are assigned to eight mutually exclusive 
categories. The observed frequencies for these categories are explained in terms of four 
latent parameters, namely, recognition validity (parameter a), knowledge validity 
(parameter b), probability of correct guessing (parameter g), and, most importantly, 
probability of RH-use (parameter r). Model parameters are typically estimated using 
the expectation-maximization algorithm of maximum likelihood estimation (Hu & 
Batchelder, 1994), assuming a (homogeneous) joint multinomial distribution of the 
data. For a comprehensive introduction and a review on MPT models, see Batchelder 
and Riefer (1999) and Erdfelder et al. (2009).  
In contrast to ad-hoc measures of RH-use, the r-model provides a measure that 
can be directly interpreted as the probability of RH-use free of confounds with 
knowledge integration and other possible influences (for a comparison of different RH 
measures, see Hilbig, 2010). Specifically, the r parameter represents the proportion of 
pure RH-use whereas the complementary probability 1 – r represents the proportion of 
using further knowledge retrieved from memory.  
The version of the r-model illustrated in Figure 2 assumes fixed parameters and 
thus cannot account for individual differences in parameter values. Based on Klauer’s 
(2010) latent-trait approach to MPT models, we thus generalized the r-model to a 
hierarchical version (see Figure 3; cf. Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016). The basic 
idea is to specify the model on two levels: On the individual level, a separate set of 
parameters (ri, ai, bi, gi) is defined for each participant i, i = 1, …, N, according to the 
r-model described above. On the hierarchical group level, the probits of these 
individual parameters are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution that 
captures the variability between individuals using group-level parameters (i.e., the 
mean vector (μa, μb, μg, μr) and the variance-covariance matrix Σ of the probit-
transformed parameters). Furthermore, to assess the influence of NFC and FII on RH-
use, personality test scores are incorporated directly into the estimation of RH-use ri in 
terms of a probit regression model. 
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More precisely, we modeled the probit-transformed individual RH-use ri as a 
linear combination of the group-level mean of RH-use μr, a multiplicative scale 
parameter ξr, individual deviations from the group mean δir, and, additionally, 
z-transformed test scores in NFC and FII along with their regression parameters βNFC 
and βFII, respectively. Thus, our core model equation was 
-1(ri) = μr + ξr ·  δir + βNFC ·  NFCi + βFII ·  FIIi, where -1(.) denotes the inverse of the 
standard normal distribution function.  
The hierarchical latent-trait r-model has a number of advantages. Consider the 
standard method to relate individual RH-use to personality variables: Model parameters 
are estimated separately for each participant and then regressed on or correlated with 
personality test scores. This way of analyzing data can be problematic for several 
reasons. First, fitting the r-model separately to each individual’s data can lead to 
unreliable and biased parameter estimates because of the relatively small number of 
observations per participant (e.g., Hilbig Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010). Second, if the 
parameter estimates are subject to measurement noise, the relation to external variables 
will in general be severely underestimated (e.g., Spearman, 1904). In contrast, the 
hierarchical latent-trait r-model estimates individual-level parameters more reliably by 
making use of the hierarchical group-level structure. Furthermore, it allows assessment 
of personality influences on RH-use in a single step by incorporating (z-transformed) 
test scores of NFC and FII into the estimation of individual RH-use ri. The estimated 
regression coefficients βNFC and βFII are thus automatically adjusted for the uncertainty 
in the individual parameter estimates of RH-use.  
All analyses were conducted within the Bayesian framework using Markov 
chain Monte Carlo sampling techniques by means of OpenBUGS (Lunn, Spiegelhalter, 
Thomas, & Best, 2009) and R2WinBUGS (Sturtz, Ligges, & Gelman, 2005). With this 
method, prior beliefs represented by prior distributions (being either informative or 
rather vague) are updated by the observed data, resulting in posterior distributions. 
Properties of the posterior distributions are used to summarize the results. Specifically, 
the mean can be interpreted as a point estimate while the 95% Bayesian credible 
interval (BCI) quantifies its precision. For a comprehensive introduction to hierarchical 
MPT-models and Bayesian modeling, see for instance Lee and Wagenmakers (2013). 
In our analyses, we defined priors following the example of Matzke, Dolan, 
Batchelder, and Wagenmakers (2015). For each analysis, we ran three chains with 
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500,000 iterations, a thinning rate of 10, and a burn-in period of 100,000. For all 
parameter estimates, we ensured chain convergence (all �̂ < 1.01; Gelman, Carlin, 
Stern, & Rubin, 2004) and sufficiently large effective samples (Kruschke, 2014). In the 
subsequent section, we report the means of the posterior distributions along with their 
95% BCIs for all parameters of interest, namely μ̂, σ̂ (derived from the variance-
covariance matrix Σ), β̂NFC, and β̂FII. Here, μ̂s represents the group-level mean and σ̂s 
the group-level standard deviation (s ∈ {a, b, r}) for recognition validity a, knowledge 
validity b, and RH-use r, respectively. Most importantly, the regression coefficients β̂NFC and β̂FII represent the influence of NFC and FII on RH-use, respectively. 
 
Results 
Six participants had to be excluded from the analyses: One participant indicated 
insufficient language skills, four participants recognized all musicians, and one did not 
recognize any river. For the remaining 76 participants, we applied the hierarchical 
latent-trait r-model described in the previous section. As expected and intended, mean 
recognition validity was higher than mean knowledge validity in the facilitation 
condition (μ̂a = .73 [.70, .76], σ̂a = .32 [.26, .39], μ̂b = .64 [.62, .66], σ̂b = .22 [.18, .27]; Δ̂a-b = .09 [.05, .13]), whereas both validities were almost identical in the neutral 
condition (μ̂a = .58 [.56, .60], σ̂a = .19 [.15, .24], μ̂b = .58 [.56, .60], σ̂b = .18 [.14, .22]; Δ̂a-b = .005 [-.02, .03]). Replicating previous studies, we identified substantial 
individual differences in RH-use as indicated by large standard deviations of r 
(μ̂r = .76 [.70, .81], σ̂r = .70 [.57, .85], and μ̂r = .58 [.50, .65], σ̂r = .82 [.68, 1.00], for the 
facilitation and the neutral condition, respectively). Furthermore, NFC and FII showed 
considerable variability across individuals (NFC: M = 5.05, SD = 0.94; FII: M = 4.38, 
SD = 0.79), and were almost uncorrelated (ρ(76) = .07, p = .58, BF10 = 0.11)3, as 
hypothesized by Epstein et al. (1996).  
In line with our first hypothesis, we found negative effects of NFC on RH-use in 
both conditions (β̂NFC = -.17 [-.32, -.01] and β̂NFC = -.20 [-.38, -.03] for the facilitation 
and the neutral condition, respectively), with a slightly larger effect in the neutral 
condition. In line with our second hypothesis, we found weak positive effects of FII on 
RH-use (β̂FII = .01 [-.14, .17] and β̂FII = .05 [-.12, .22] for the facilitation and the neutral 
                                                 
3
 The Bayes factor for the correlation was computed according to Wetzels and Wagenmakers 
(2012). 
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condition, respectively). However, both 95% BCIs include zero and thus indicate that 
the influence of FII was not reliable in either condition. Inclusion of the Big Five 
personality traits as additional (z-transformed) predictors into the model did not change 
the pattern of results (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Hence, NFC affects RH-use even 
if individual differences in the Big Five traits are statistically controlled for. To check 
for further possible confounds, we replicated the analyses while controlling for 
(z-transformed) individual recognition and knowledge validities in addition. Again, this 
changed the results only marginally (see Table A2 in the Appendix). As one might 
expect, individual recognition validities affected RH-use positively (i.e., the higher the 
individual RH success rate, the more often the RH is used) whereas individual 
knowledge validities affect RH-use negatively (i.e., the higher the individual 
knowledge-use success rate, the less RH use). However, in contrast to the effect of 
NFC, both validity effects were insignificant.  
 
Discussion 
People differ in their preferences for specific decision strategies. Some 
individuals seem to prefer fast and simple strategies, like the RH (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002), while others seem to favor more complex and cognitively 
demanding strategies, such as knowledge integration. Since these individual differences 
are stable across time, sets of choice objects, presentation modalities, and even decision 
domains (Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016), we tested a personality framework – the 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory – as a potential explanation (Epstein et al., 1996). 
According to Epstein and colleagues, individuals may rely on two systems of 
information processing, the rational and the experiential system, that are independent 
and can work simultaneously. The rational system is assumed to be analytic and 
effortful, while the experiential system is assumed to be automatic and effortless. 
Epstein and colleagues argued that most individuals have a preference for one of the 
two systems. These preferences correspond to two personality traits: NFC (i.e., 
enjoyment of cognitively demanding activities) and FII (i.e., trust in feelings and 
impressions). Based on the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, we predicted NFC to 
diminish RH-use and FII to foster it. In addition, based on Mischel’s (1973) dichotomy 
of strong versus weak situations, we expected relatively small effects of NFC and FII 
when the optimal decision strategy is largely determined by the decision context 
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because all people adapt their decision strategies to situational constraints to some 
degree. In contrast, we expected more pronounced effects of NFC and FII when the 
decision context does not favor any strategy because contextual influences on strategy 
selection are minimized. 
We analyzed our data with a hierarchical latent-trait version of the r-model 
(Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010; Klauer, 2010; Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016), 
including NFC and FII as predictors of RH-use. Using this formal framework, the effect 
of NFC and FII can be estimated more reliably than by means of standard analyses (i.e., 
applying the r-model to the data of each participant separately followed by a regression 
of RH-use on personality measures). In line with our first hypothesis, NFC affected 
RH-use negatively, irrespective of whether the decision domain fostered RH-use or not. 
In other words, participants who enjoy engagement in cognitively demanding tasks 
preferred knowledge-use over RH-use more than those who dislike demanding tasks. 
This is consistent with prior work showing that people high in NFC make less use of 
certain heuristics (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006) and not only incorporate more 
information overall but also more varied information (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Nair & 
Ramnarayan, 2000). Notably, the observed difference of NFC effects on RH-use 
between decision domains was only marginal. Hence, NFC can be considered a rather 
general predictor of strategy selection, because the negative influence of NFC on RH-
use manifests itself even under strong situational demands that foster RH use, and not 
only under neutral conditions where contextual influences are minimized.  
When assessing the strength of NFC effects on RH-use, it is important to keep 
in mind that Michalkiewicz and Erdfelder (2016) observed test-retest correlations for 
RH-use ranging between .33 and .80 (depending on the length of the test-retest interval 
and differences in decision objects, domains, and presentation modalities). Since 
validity coefficients cannot be expected to exceed test-retest correlations, any 
correlation between NFC and RH-use close to .30 can be considered evidence for a 
strong effect of NFC. By re-transforming the NFC regression coefficients reported in 
the results section into bivariate correlations, we derived correlation estimates of ρ̂ = -.23 [-.43, -.02] and ρ̂ = -.24 [-.42, -.04] for the facilitation and the neutral 
condition, respectively. Thus, compared to the results of Michalkiewicz and Erdfelder 
(2016), the effects observed in the present study can be classified as moderate to strong.  
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It is also interesting to compare our results to findings of Hilbig, Scholl, and 
Pohl (2010). At a first glance, our results seem to contradict theirs. Hilbig and 
colleagues found that participants who were prompted to think deliberately applied the 
RH more often compared to those who were prompted to think intuitively (still, both 
groups applied the RH roughly equally often as in previous experiments). To explain 
this finding, they suggested that a deliberate mode of processing is more effortful and 
demanding, and that people use the RH more often to reduce this effort. By contrast, 
they suggested that an intuitive mode of processing is more automatic and effortless, 
thus rendering effort reduction less necessary.  
In our study, we apparently found the opposite result, namely, that participants 
high in NFC (i.e., those preferring a deliberate processing style) used the RH less often. 
However, there is one important difference between these two studies: We assessed 
effects of an individual trait whereas Hilbig, Scholl, and Pohl (2010) prompted their 
subjects to use a specific mode of thinking irrespective of their individual disposition. 
One way to reconcile the conflicting results is based on the following argument: In the 
experiment by Hilbig and colleagues, individuals who disfavored deliberate processing 
(i.e., low NFC individuals) but were instructed to use it in Hilbig, Scholl, and Pohl’s 
(2010) experiment may have been overwhelmed by the cognitive effort associated with 
search for, reflection of, and integration of relevant further knowledge (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982). They probably compensated this cognitive overload by using less effortful 
strategies (i.e., the RH) even more frequently than when instructed to decide in line 
with their processing style. In contrast, individuals high in NFC think deliberately by 
default and thus can handle the cognitive effort associated with information search and 
integration (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). They enjoy cognitively demanding tasks and 
therefore probably avoid using the RH even when instructed to decide more intuitively 
and automatically. Hence, the result observed by Hilbig and colleagues might be due to 
a subsample of participants low in NFC. Unfortunately, since measures of NFC or FII 
were not obtained in their study, there is no direct way to test this explanation. 
Unexpectedly, we did not find a noticeable effect of FII on RH-use, not even in 
the neutral condition where it should be easiest to observe (Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 
2016). In other words, participants who principally trust their feelings and generally 
prefer experiential cues did not show significantly enhanced use of the RH. One 
possible explanation might be that the vast majority of participants were students, a 
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group of persons typically high in NFC. In line with this explanation, the average NFC 
value was quite high in our study whereas the average FII value was low compared to 
previous studies (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Hence, NFC effects 
were potentially masking FII effects. Furthermore, FII scores did not exhaust the 
possible scale range in our student sample (Min = 2.53, Max = 6.47, on a 1 to 7 scale). 
A replication study using a non-student sample might shed more light on this problem. 
Also note that our null finding concerning FII does not seem to be particularly 
uncommon. Work by Keller et al. (2000), for example, has already shown that high FII 
does not automatically lead to more heuristic use. This suggests that the causal link 
between the experiential information processing trait (as indexed by the FII scale) and 
preferential use of simple heuristics is less clear than presumed by Epstein and 
colleagues (1996).  
In sum, we found supportive evidence for the hypothesis that NFC hampers RH-
use. In contrast, we found no convincing evidence for the corresponding hypothesis that 
FII boosts RH-use. Thus, our work contributes to clarifying individual differences in 
heuristic use and to identifying their sources (e.g., Pachur et al., 2008). An important 
goal for future research will be to promote this research program further (e.g., by 
focusing on potential moderators for FII effects on RH-use) and perhaps extend it to 
other potential personality determinants of decision strategy selection. To conclude, our 
current work suggests that this line of research is likely to advance our knowledge on 
determinants of decision strategy choice and thus to add to a comprehensive theory of 
decision making. 
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Figures 
          
Figure 1. Proportions of use of the RH per participant for the data from Michalkiewicz and 
Erdfelder (2016, Exp. 2 Session 1). Individual RH-use is estimated via the r parameter of the 
hierarchical latent-trait r-model described in the methods section, and ordered by size. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of the r-model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010). Observable and 
unobservable events are presented as rectangles vs. rectangles with rounded corners. For 
each of the J = 3 object pairs (both, none, or one object recognized), responses are assigned to 
one of m ∈ {1,..,M} categories Cjm and modeled by means of parameters a, b, g, and r 
representing recognition validity, knowledge validity, probability of correct guessing, and 
probability of RH-use, respectively.  
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Figure 3. Illustration of the hierarchical latent-trait r-model including NFC and FII as predictors 
of RH-use (adapted from Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016). The graph shows the relations 
among observed data and latent model parameters, presented as shaded and unshaded notes, 
respectively. Discrete and continuous variables are presented as square vs. circular nodes, to 
be estimated and derived variables as single- vs. double-bordered nodes. The plates show 
replications over I individuals and the J object cases (none, one, or both objects recognized). 
P(Cij) represents the category probabilities of the r-model for vectors of category counts Cij and 
Nij observations for individual i and object case j. For individual parameters si (s ∈ {a, b, g, r}) μs 
depicts the group mean, δis the individual deviation from the group mean, and ξs a multiplicative 
scale parameter. The influence of NFC and FII on RH-use ri is assessed by regression 
parameters βNFC and βFII.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. 
Influence of need for cognition, faith in intuition, and the Big Five personality traits on 
use of the recognition heuristic assessed via the hierarchical latent-trait r-model. 
 
Regression coefficients (with 95% BCIs) 
Variables Facilitation condition Neutral condition 
Need for cognition -.27 [-.47, -.06] -0.32 [-0.56, -0.07] 
Faith in intuition .03 [-.13, .20] 0.07 [-0.13, 0.26] 
Neuroticism .04 [-.13, .22] -0.02 [-0.23, 0.18] 
Extraversion .03 [-.14, .20] -0.07 [-0.26, 0.13] 
Openness for new experiences .21 [.01, .41] 0.17 [-0.06, 0.41] 
Agreeableness -.01 [-.17, .14] 0.03 [-0.16, 0.21] 
Conscientiousness -.10 [-.26, .20] 0.09 [-0.10, 0.28] 
Note. Estimates are based on one million iterations per chain. 
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Table A2. 
Influence of need for cognition, faith in intuition, recognition and knowledge validities 
on use of the recognition heuristic assessed via the hierarchical latent-trait r-model. 
 
Regression coefficients (with 95% BCIs) 
Variables  Facilitation condition Neutral condition 
Need for cognition -0.17 [-0.33, -0.01] -.21 [-.39, -.03] 
Faith in intuition 0.02 [-0.14, 0.17] .05 [-.12, .22] 
Recognition validity 0.18 [-0.33, 0.68] .08 [-.46, .61] 
Knowledge validity -0.06 [-0.45, 0.31] .03 [-.21, .27] 
Note. Estimates are based on one million iterations per chain. 
 
